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THE INFLUENCE OF ENHANCED THRIFT
INSTITUTION POWERS ON COMMERCIAL
BANK MARKET EXPANSION
LiSSA LAMKIN BROOMEt
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Act of
1982 allowed savings and loan associations and savings banks to take
deposits and lend funds in ways previously available only to commercial
banks. One of the most important effects of this enhancement of thrift
powers has been an increase in market expansion opportunities available
to banks and bank holding companies. In this Article, Professor Broome
describes the enhanced powers granted thrifts and how this enhancement
resulted in changes in the application of legal rules limiting bank mar-
ket expansion. She examines whether these changes are warranted, es-
pecially in the light of the failure of thrifts generally to take advantage
of their new powers to a significant extent. Finally, the Article specu-
lates that the increases in banking market expansion opportunities may
have potentially far-reaching effects on the structure of our depository
institutions system, including increased centralization of banking and a
breakdown of the separate regulatory structures applicable to banks and
thrifts at the state and federal level.
In the early 1980s Congress granted thrift institutions deposit-taking and
lending powers previously reserved to commercial banks. Prior to these
changes, thrifts could generally make only home mortgage loans1 and offer only
savings accounts. 2 Commercial banks, however, were permitted to make a vari-
ety of loans, including commercial loans, and could offer customers checking
accounts in addition to savings accounts. 3
Thrift institutions include savings and loan associations and savings banks.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1978, Uni-
versity of Illinois; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School. This project was supported by a grant from the
University of North Carolina Law Center Foundation. I wish to thank Adam H. Broome, Caroline
N. Brown, Robert A. Eisenbeis, S. Elizabeth Gibson, Martin B. Louis, and Judith W. Wegner for
their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to acknowledge
the able research assistance of David G. Powell and Scott D. Jensen.
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1976) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)); see E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW TEACHING MATERIALS at 54 (2d ed. 1984)
("[T]he loan portfolio of a savings and loan association has been highly specialized in that its pri-
mary function has been to finance the purchase or construction of housing."); Fein, The Fragmented
Depository Institutions System: A Case for Unification, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 633, 643 (1980).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (amended 1982); see Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1716, 82 Stat. 476, 608 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1982)) (amending the Home Owners' Loan Act expressly to prohibit checking
accounts).
3. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (Supp. IV 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43(1) (1982); see also
Fein, supra note 1, at 676 ("Until recently, commercial banks were the only financial institutions
vested with unquestioned legal authority to offer demand deposit accounts.").
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Both may receive federal charters from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.4
Alternatively, state charters are available from state authorities for savings and
loan associations in all statesS and for savings banks in those states that issue a
separate charter for such institutions.6 Commercial banks may also choose be-
tween a national charter, issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency,7 or a state charter issued by state banking authorities.8
Following the enactment of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, all federally insured thrift institutions (state and
federally chartered) may offer NOW accounts-the functional equivalent of in-
terest-bearing checking accounts-to consumer customers. 9 These acts also au-
thorized federally chartered thrift institutions to devote a portion of their assets
to loans other than home mortgage loans, including nonresidential real estate
loans, nonmortgage consumer loans, and commercial loans,10 and to offer non-
interest bearing checking accounts to commercial loan customers.' 1 Finally, the
acts granted federally chartered thrifts authority to exercise trust and fiduciary
powers and to provide credit card services.12 Many states have granted corre-
spondingly extensive powers to state-chartered thrift institutions, either specifi-
cally 13 or through "wild card" provisions that permit state-chartered thrift
institutions to engage in any activity authorized for federally chartered thrift
institutions from time to time. 14 Since checking accounts and commercial loans
were previously the exclusive domain of commercial banks, the enhancement of
thrift powers necessarily gave thrifts a bank-like appearance. It is therefore not
4. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(a) (West Supp. 1988) (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is author-
ized to issue charters to "associations to be known as Federal savings and loan associations, or
Federal savings banks").
5. 2 M. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS 962-63 (1988) (listing state savings and
loan association chartering statutes).
6. Currently only 17 states provide for the chartering of savings banks. ALASKA STAT.
§ 06.15.020 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-1421 (West 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-6.1-1
(Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §§ 111, 511 (1980); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 4-
201 (1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.12(3)
(West 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386A:I (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-7 (West Supp.
1988); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 230 (McKinney 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 716.028 (1987); 7 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1002 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-2-1 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 552 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 33.08.020, 33.08.030 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 222.01 (West 1982); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 933 (1985). The lack of geographical diversity
in the states offering a savings bank charter stems from the "relatively small number of wage earners
in the agricultural South and West during the early nineteenth century, and hence the small demand
for places to deposit savings. By the time such institutions were required their need was filled by
already existing commercial banks and savings and loan associations." E. SYMONS & J. WHITE,
supra note 1, at 52.
Some states allow state-chartered savings and loan associations to use the words "savings bank"
in their names, but name notwithstanding, these institutions are savings and loan associations. E.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54B-26 (Supp. 1987) (A state-chartered savings and loan association may use in
its name "the words 'savings bank' in lieu of the words 'savings and loan association.' ").
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
8. 2 M. MALLOY, supra note 5, at 958-59 (listing state bank chartering statutes).
9. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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surprising that decision-makers now view thrifts as the functional equivalent of
commercial banks in evaluating proposed expansions by banks and bank holding
companies.
Such expansion may occur in a number of ways. A bank may expand the
market it serves within a state either by establishing a new branch 15 or by com-
bining with an existing commercial bank through merger or acquisition. 16 Two
additional market expansion methods are available to bank holding companies
that allow, in certain cases, for expansion into additional states. A bank holding
company may acquire another bank as a bank subsidiary 17 or may acquire a
nonbanking subsidiary whose activities are considered closely related and a
proper incident to banking.18 Recent bank and bank holding company expan-
sion has occurred through all of these methods.
Most academic and popular attention has focused on interstate banking ex-
pansion by bank holding company acquisition of a bank subsidiary. 19 The
Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act prohibits such an ac-
quisition unless specifically permitted by statute in the target bank's state.20 Un-
til the 1970s, no state had enacted a statute authorizing interstate bank
acquisitions. 2 1 Now, almost every state permits interstate acquisitions to some
degree, and a large number of interstate bank acquisitions have been
consummated.22
Changes in the legal rules governing the remaining three market expansion
methods available to banks and bank holding companies have received less at-
tention than interstate bank acquisitions. These changes are nevertheless
equally significant in their potential effect on the structure of the depository in-
stitutions system. The 1987 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Department of Banking and Consumer Finance v. Clarke
(Deposit Guaranty)23 eased restrictions on branching by national banks. Deposit
Guaranty found that state-chartered thrifts with bank-like powers were carrying
on the banking business for purposes of the McFadden Act, 24 which provides
that national banks may branch only to the extent permitted by state law for
15. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982); see infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Eisen, Banking Acquisition Procedures by Holding Companies, 101 BANKING L.J.
681 (1984); Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REV. 301 (1987); Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (1981); Note,
The Constitutionality of State Statutes Governing Interstate Acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies:
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 59 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 380 (1985).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
21. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
163 (1985).
22. See id. at 174-78 (upholding the constitutionality of a popular type of interstate banking
statute-a regional, reciprocal interstate compact); 6 H. PITr, D. MILES & A. AIN, THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES app. DD (1988) (compilation of state interstate banking statutes).
23. 809 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3240 (1987).
24. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1244 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982)).
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state institutions carrying on the "banking business."'25 Deposit Guaranty thus
allows a national bank to establish a branch in a location authorized for a state-
chartered thrift, even though state banks are subject to more restrictive branch-
ing provisions.2 6 Scrutiny of the antitrust consequences of commercial bank
mergers has similarly eased in reviews by the federal banking agencies and the
Department of Justice which now routinely include thrift institutions in the
market for purposes of evaluating a proposed merger's effect on competition. 27
Finally, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated a proposed regulation that
would allow a bank holding company to expand its market by the acquisition of
a healthy thrift institution as a nonbanking subsidiary. 2 8 Such acquisitions are
generally limited to the acquisition of financially troubled thrifts under current
regulatory interpretations implementing the Bank Holding Company Act.
Part I of the Article sets out the enhancement of thrift powers enacted in
the 1980 and 1982 legislation and the effect of the legislation on the activities of
thrifts.29 Part II then describes how that enhancement resulted in changes in
the application of legal limitations on market expansion by banks and bank
holding companies and evaluates these changes in the light of the fact that thrifts
have not generally taken advantage of many of their new bank lending powers.
Section A examines branching opportunities for national banks under the Mc-
Fadden Act provision allowing a national bank to branch to the same extent as a
state institution carrying on the banking business. The section concludes that
state-chartered thrifts that have been authorized to engage in enhanced powers
are carrying on the banking business and that national banks should therefore
enjoy branching privileges equivalent to state thrifts. Section B reviews judicial
and regulatory decisions setting out the standards under which bank mergers are
evaluated for antitrust purposes and examines whether the products and services
thrifts presently offer, or might offer in response to noncompetitive pricing by
banks, should be included in the market in which a merger's effect on competi-
tion is measured. The section concludes that existing Supreme Court precedent
excluding thrifts entirely from the market definition is unwarranted and pro-
poses that an approach employing separate product markets be adopted. Section
C evaluates the proposed regulation permitting bank holding company acquisi-
tion of healthy thrifts and concludes that such acquisitions should be allowed.
In view of the specific provisions of the 1982 legislation addressing failing thrift
acquisitions, however, the proposal should be effected through congressional au-
thorization rather than regulatory revision. Section D of Part II concludes that
the enhancement of thrift powers has made it appropriate to consider thrift insti-
tutions functionally equivalent to commercial banks for purposes of these bank-
ing market expansion methods. Part III suggests that these increased bank and
bank holding company market expansion methods may have important effects
on the structure of our depository institutions system by leading to greater cen-
25. See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
26. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 270-71.
27. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
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tralization of banking and to the eventual breakdown of the separate regulatory
structures governing commercial banks and thrift institutions.
I. STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE POWERS OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
IN 1980 AND 1982
A. Problems Experienced by Commercial Banks and Thrift Institutions
Before 1980
The statutory changes in the powers of thrifts in the 1980s were brought
about by the inflation of the late 1970s, which increased market interest rates
and seriously impaired the earnings of commercial banks and thrift institu-
tions. 30 One effect of inflation was that customers withdrew savings and time
deposits from commercial banks and thrifts for investment in competing prod-
ucts, most notably money market mutual funds, that offered higher returns than
those paid by depository institutions subject to regulated interest rate ceilings. 31
30. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 3-4 (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter 1980 TASK FORCE REPORT]; Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A His-
torical Perspective on Current Issues, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 6, 26 (G. Benston ed. 1983) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES]; Langevoort,
Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Bank-
ing Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 681-82 (1987); Simpson, Developments in the U.S. Financial
System Since the Mid-1970s, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 1-2, 4 (1988); see F. BALDERSTON, THRIFTS IN
CRISIS: STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 5 (1985) (interest
rates became increasingly volatile in 1979 when the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would
no longer try to restrain inflation by maintaining interest rates but instead would attempt to fight
inflation by restricting the growth of the money supply).
31. See PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q, DEPOSIT INTEREST
RATE CEILINGS AND HOUSING CREDIT 8-9 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 REGULATION Q REPORT]
(This process is often referred to as disintermediation.); Mahoney & White, The Thrift Industry in
Transition, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 137, 137 (1985); see also Eisenbeis, Inflation and Regulation: The
Effects on Financial Institutions and Structure, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 65, 68
(1985) (depositors became more sensitive to slight differentials in interest rate movements). From
1968 to 1981 passbook savings accounts declined from 77% of total savings and loan assets to below
25%. Kane, Impact of Regulation on Economic Behavior, 36 J. FIN. 355, 359 (1981). In turn,
money market mutual funds grew from $2 billion in 1974 to $200 billion in 1982. F. BALDERSTON,
supra note 30, at 6.
Money market mutual funds are mutual funds created by investment companies that allow
small investors to pool their funds and invest in short-term, money market instruments, such as
treasury bills, that earn market rates of interest. Benston, Introduction to FINANCIAL SERVICES,
supra note 30, at 1, 2. As inflation increased interest rates and computer technology reduced the cost
of effecting financial transactions, new institutions entered this newly attractive market. Id. at 2; see
R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 33 (1987); Kane, supra, at 359-61.
Interest rate ceilings at commercial banks and thrifts were imposed by Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.7 (1980). See Special Project, Usury and Monetary ControlAct of 1980, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
27, 233 (It was hoped that by restricting interest rates paid on deposits, stable deposit costs would
eliminate the need for bank investment in risky, but high yielding, assets.).
In March of 1980 commercial banks were limited to five and one-quarter percent interest on
savings accounts, and thrift institutions were limited to the slightly higher rate of five and one-half
percent. See S. REP. No. 1601, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2994, 2996 (Thrifts were granted a slightly higher ceiling interest rate than the ceil-
ing that was made applicable to commercial bank deposits to assist thrifts in attracting deposits that
could be used for home mortgage lending.); A. CARRON, THE PLIGHT OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 5,
7 (1982); C. HENNING, W. PIGOTr & R. ScoTr, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 190
(4th ed. 1984). In contrast, money market mutual funds were offering investors the Treasury bill
rate of return which was between fourteen and fifteen percent. 1980 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 30, at 11.
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Commercial banks also lost checking account deposits to money market mutual
funds. Although commercial banks were then the only institutions authorized to
offer checking accounts for making payments to third parties (sometimes re-
ferred to as demand deposits),3 2 they could not pay interest on these accounts. 33
Money market mutual funds paid interest on invested funds and offered limited
third-party payment features.34
To meet withdrawal demands, some depository institutions borrowed
money at high market interest rates or sold, at large discounts, assets earning
below-market interest rates, such as low-interest-rate mortgage loans. 35 More-
over, without newly deposited funds to invest, depository institutions were de-
prived of opportunities for earnings growth. 36
Thrift institutions were especially disadvantaged by inflation.37 Rising
market interest rates made deposits more costly, yet the statutory requirement
that thrifts devote the principal portion of their assets to long-term, fixed-rate
mortgage loans constrained earnings from those deposits. 38 Existing home mort-
32. Demand deposits are accessible upon the customer's demand and may be used to make
payments to third parties. Thrift institutions were not authorized to offer these accounts, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(b)(1) (amended 1982), "in recognition of their role as thrift institutions designed to en-
courage savings." Fein, supra note 1, at 676 & n.266.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1976) (amended 1980); id. § 371a.
34. C. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & R. SCOTT, supra note 31, at 124 (A limited number ofchecks,
usually restricted to amounts exceeding $500, could be written on money market funds each
month.); Barr & Soloway, Deposit Account Developments, 43 Bus. LAW. 987, 987 (1988)
("[b]rokerage firms began to offer money market mutual fund accounts with transaction
capabilities").
35. Savage, Depository Financial Institutions, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 177, 200
(1985).
36. Special Project, supra note 31, at 251-52 (reduced lending supplies are a result of a shift of
funds by savings depositors away from thrifts and commercial banks and into market securities); see
E. RoUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 73 (1984) (when market
interest rates rose above the deposit interest ceiling rates, "thrifts suffered sharp contractions in the
growth of mortgage funds").
37. L. SPELLMAN, THE DEPOSITORY FIRM AND INDUSTRY: THEORY, HISTORY, AND REGU-
LATION 32-37 (1982) (general discussion of inflation's effect on thrifts). Although commercial banks
also felt the deleterious effects of inflation, because of their wider investment authority these institu-
tions had a different portfolio structure and their shorter-term loans were earning interest at or near
the current market rates. A. CARRON, supra note 31, at 15 ("Commercial banks hold a substantially
smaller share of their assets in long-term fixed-rate investments [than do thrifts] .... So policies
addressing the thrift industry's asset inflexibility need not affect the operations of commercial
banks.").
38. Benston & Kaufman, Risks and Failures in Banking: Overview, History, and Evaluation, in
DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 49, 55 (1986); Gagnon & Yokas,
Recent Developments in Federal and New England Banking Laws, NEw ENG. ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1983, at 18 ("Thrifts, which had been legally obligated to invest primarily in long-term mortgages,
saw their cost of funds rising faster than the return on their mortgage portfolios."); Huertas, supra
note 30, at 26 ("regulations had induced [thrifts] to take a large interest rate risk-their fixed-rate,
long-term mortgages were funded with short-term deposists"); Kaufman, Mote & Rosenblum, The
Future of Commercial Banks in the Financial Services Industry, in FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note
30, at 94, 103 (Thrifts "were locked in to low fixed-rate mortgages that they had made in earlier
periods of slower inflation, and payment of the higher deposit rates would have been a serious drain
on their resources."); Roster, The Modern Role of Thrifts, 18 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1985);
see S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3054, 3059 ("The problems... have largely resulted from an economic environment characterized
by high and volatile interest rates, in which the cost of funds has increased rapidly while slow repay-
ment of old mortgages has led to an extremely sluggish increase in gross asset yields.").
This maturity mismatch between long-term thrift assets being funded by short-term thrift liabil-
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gage loans could not be repriced to meet the increasing costs of attracting
deposits.
3 9
B. Congressional Responses: The Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St Germain Act of 1982
Congress responded to these problems with the Monetary Control Act of
198040 and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.41 The Monetary Control Act
provided for the elimination of interest rate ceilings on savings account bal-
ances42 and granted to all federally insured commercial banks and thrift institu-
tions the ability to offer consumer depositors negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts-the functional equivalent of interest-bearing checking ac-
counts-to aid depository institutions in competing with money market mutual
funds.43
The Monetary Control Act also granted federally chartered thrifts opportu-
ities was not a problem when there was no inflation and interest rates remained relatively stable. Id.
("Thrifts had been accustomed to a relatively stable economic environment in which a positive yield
curve was the norm, and they had been able to remain profitable by borrowing short and lending
long.").
39. See Special Project, supra note 31, at 250-51.
40. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 132 (current version in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
41. The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (current version in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
42. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 204, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (current ver-
sion at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a)-(b) (1982)) ("to provide for the orderly phase-out and the ultimate elimi-
nation of the limitations on the maximum rates of interest and dividends which may be paid"). The
phase-out of Regulation Q was to be executed over a period of years in order to give thrift institu-
tions time to take advantage of newly authorized lending powers. Thrift institutions thus would
have an opportunity to increase their earnings and be in a position to attract deposits by paying
market interest rates. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 298, 303 (The extension of Regulation Q is intended "to permit
thrifts to organize themselves to compete in a market environment.").
43. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 1832(a)(1)
(1982)). A NOW account technically is a savings account that permits the customer to transfer
funds from the account to a third party by use of a negotiable order of withdrawal that directs the
depository institution to pay the funds withdrawn to the third party. Fein, supra note 1, at 676-77.
The customer's funds are transferred from a savings account, so interest may be paid on what, in
effect, is a checking account. Id. at 677.
State-chartered thrift institutions in several northeastern states developed NOW accounts in the
early 1970s in response to inflationary pressures and the resulting loss of deposits to unregulated
money market mutual funds. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, § 26 (Law. Co-op. 1977). Feder-
ally insured depository institutions could begin offering NOW accounts as of December 31, 1980.
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 306, 94 Stat. 132, 147 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 371a note (1982)). NOW account funds may be held only by "one or more individuals or
by an organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational,
or other similar purposes and which is not operated for profit." Id. § 303(2) (current version at 12
U.S.C.A. § 1832(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988)).
The Monetary Control Act also specifically authorized other forms of demand deposit substi-
tutes that had been developed by commercial banks and thrifts in the late 1970s. Id. § 302 (amend-
ing 12 U.S.C. § 271a) (automatic transfer accounts-these accounts would be beneficial for business
customers not eligible for NOW accounts); id. § 304 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (b)(1)) (remote
service units for federally chartered savings and loan associations); see Special Project, supra note 3 1,
at 261.
Finally, in an effort to help depository institutions attract large deposits, Congress increased
federal deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 per account to $100,000 per account. Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 308, 94 Stat. 132, 147 (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724, 1811 note (1982)); H.R.
1989]
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nities to make short-term loans to help alleviate their mismatch in deposit and
loan maturities. 44 The Act gave federally chartered thrifts the power to invest a
limited percentage of their assets in secured or unsecured consumer loans45 and
loans secured by improved nonresidential real estate.4 6 In addition, the Act
granted federally chartered thrifts trust and fiduciary powers 47 and the authority
to provide credit card services. 48 Finally, the Act granted federal savings banks
the authority to devote a small percentage of their assets to commercial loans
and to offer demand deposits to those commercial loan customers. 49
Apparently finding the 1980 measures insufficient, Congress enacted the
Garn-St Germain Act in 1982 to grant thrifts even greater powers.50 This Act
expanded consumer loan authority for federal thrifts to thirty percent of assets 1
and enlarged nonresidential real estate loan authority to forty percent of as-
CONF. REP. No. 842, supra note 42, at 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
298, 308.
44. See Special Project, supra note 31, at 257 ("the Act contains several measures designed to
improve the earning power and competitive ability of thrift institutions").
45. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 132, 151, 153 (current version at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1464(c)(2) (West Supp. 1988)) (up to 20% of assets); H.R.CoNF. REP. No. 842, supra note 42, at
76, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 298, 306.
46. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 132, 153 (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1988)) (up to 20% of assets).
47. Id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(n) (1982)); H.R. CONF. REP,
No. 842, supra note 42, at 76, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 298, 306; see
also S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 236, 248 (by providing trust services, in addition to other newly authorized powers, federal
savings and loan associations will be able to provide consumers with all of their household borrow-
ing needs).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 402, 94 Stat. at 155-56 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(4)
(1982)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 842, supra note 42, at 76, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 298, 306.
49. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 408, 94 Stat. at 160 (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(a) (West
Supp. 1988)) (up to 5% of assets, limited to borrowers located within the state or within 75 miles of
the home office of the mutual savings bank); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 842, supra note 42, at 77, re.
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 307.
50. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (current version in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
goals of the Garn-St Germain Act were similar to those of the Monetary Control Act- "to enhance
the competitiveness of depository institutions" vis-A-vis nondepository institutions, such as money
market mutual funds, and "to expand the range of services provided by such institutions," especially
thrift institutions. See S. REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3055. The Garn-St Germain Act also eliminated all previous distinctions be-
tween federally chartered savings and loan associations and federal savings banks. Id. at 87, re-
printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3130.
In increasing the loan powers of federally chartered thrifts, Congress pointed to evidence that
savings and loan associations chartered by the state of Texas earned a higher return on nontradi-
tional assets than they earned on mortgages, thus increasing their earnings and strengthening their
financial position. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3067. At
the same time, however, Texas thrifts remained firmly committed to home mortgage lending. Id.
Other states also granted state thrift institutions increasingly flexible lending powers, and it was
noted that liberalization of investment powers of federal thrifts would make federal thrifts more
competitive with their state counterparts. Id.
51. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 329, 96 Stat. 1469, 1502 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B)
(1982)). The consumer lending authority also extends to investments in inventory and floor plan-
ning. "[Tihe Committee intends that any inventory or similar financing be arranged in conjunction
with extensions of-consumer credit or, in other words, to facilitate the purchase by consumers of
retail goods." S. REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG, & ADMIN.
NEWS 3054, 3070.
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sets.52 Finally, the Act authorized federal thrifts to devote up to ten percent of
assets to secured or unsecured loans for commercial purposes5 3 and to offer non-
interest-bearing demand deposits to their commercial loan customers. 54 Con-
gress also directed that a new account be created for depository institutions that
would be directly equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual
funds with no limitation on the maximum interest rate payable on the account.55
Congress recognized in the Garn-St Germain Act that the financial condi-
tion of some depository institutions was so poor that only special measures
might preserve these institutions. Accordingly, the Act authorized, in certain
circumstances, the acquisition of a failed thrift or bank by either a bank holding
company or a savings and loan holding company on an interstate basis overrid-
ing other federal statutory provisions that might limit such interstate and inter-
industry acquisitions.5 6
The 1980 and 1982 legislation also affected the powers of state-chartered
thrifts in the majority of states that had "wild card" provisions authorizing state
thrifts to engage in those activities permitted their federally chartered counter-
parts.5 7 Many of the states without wild card provisions authorized similar ex-
52. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 322, 96 Stat. 1469, 1499 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B)
(1982)).
53. Id. § 325, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(R) (1982)) (From
the effective date of the Act until January 1, 1984, federally chartered savings and loan associations
could devote only 5% of assets to commercial loans; federally chartered mutual savings banks could
devote 7.5% of assets to commercial loans.); S. REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 16, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3070 (the percentage-of-assets limit on commercial loans
will permit thrift institutions to diversify their portfolios and remain profitable throughout business
cycles).
54. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 312, 96 Stat. 1469, 1496-97 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(b)(1)(A) (1982)). Section 312 further provides that federal thrift institutions may not pay
interest on these demand accounts. Id. (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1)(B) (1982)).
55. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 327, 96 Stat. 1469, 1501 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)
(1982)) (directing the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, which had been formed by
the Monetary Control Act of 1980, to create a new account that would allow up to three
preauthorized or automatic transfers per month and up to three third-party transfers per month); S.
REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 88, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3054,
3131.
56. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 121, 96 Stat. at 1479-80 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)
(1982)) (emergency acquisitions of failed or failing thrift institutions insured by FSLIC); id. § 116,
96 Stat. at 1476-77 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1982)) (emergency acquisitions of failed
or failing commercial banks insured by the FDIC); see infra notes 322-30 and accompanying text
(discussing bank holding company acquisitions of failing thrifts).
57. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-402(B) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1860.1
(1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178g (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1921 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 26-1934 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, % 3301-9(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 534.111 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5601 (1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 289.705(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-504 (1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.53 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 369.144(7) (Vernon Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-2-111 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-355 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 673.225 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-A:4 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12b-48(21) (West
1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-10-50 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 7-02-14 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1155.18 (Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 381.9 (1971); OR. REv. STAT. § 722.204
(1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020-101(22) (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-23-15
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-3-106 (1980);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.05 (Vernon Supp. 1989): UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-741
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tensive powers for their state-chartered thrifts through specific legislation.-8
The enhancement of thrift powers in the 1980 and 1982 legislation gave
thrifts the ability to offer products and services that previously had been pro-
vided exclusively by commercial banks. These products and services included
checking accounts, nonresidential real estate loans, nonmortgage consumer
loans (including credit card loans), commercial loans, and the ability to exercise
trust and fiduciary powers. All federally chartered thrifts and many state-
chartered thrifts are now specifically authorized to offer these products and
services.
C. Direct Effects of the 1980 and 1982 Legislation
Most thrifts have taken advantage of increased deposit-taking powers au-
thorized in the 1980 Act and offer NOW accounts to consumers,5 9 but few thrift
institutions have shortened the maturity of their loan portfolios by taking advan-
tage, to any significant extent, of the shorter-term lending opportunities made
available to them in the form of commercial loans and nonmortgage consumer
loans. 60 Thrift assets remain concentrated in home mortgage loans. 6t In 1987
only 1.88% of the assets of FSLIC-insured institutions were invested in com-
mercial and industrial loans, although up to 10% of the assets of federal thrift
institutions may be committed to commercial loans. 62 Thrifts have devoted a
(1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1836(b) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 33.12.012, 33.12.014
(1986); Wis. ADMIN. CODE j S-L 30 (1986).
For the most part, the powers of state-chartered and federally chartered thrift institutions have
stayed roughly equivalent. SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF IssuEs RE-
LATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 364 (Comm. Print 1976) (FHLBB Staff
Study, "Branching in the Savings and Loan Industry: Economic Analysis and Federal Policy Re-
view") ("[O]ne finds that as innovations and new practices ... are introduced into some of the State
systems or, alternatively, into the Federal system, the result is to induce the adoption of many of
these innovations and practices by most or all of the systems.").
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-182c (West 1987); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 383(13)
(McKinney Supp. 1988).
59. See Fortier & Phillis, Bank and Thrift Performance Since DIDMCA, ECON. PERSPECTIVES,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 58, 58-59.
60. Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 137 (There is still a "fundamental imbalance in the
asset and liability structure of thrift[s].").
61. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRENDS IN THRIFT INDUSTRY PER-
FORMANCE: DECEMBER 1977 THROUGH JUNE 1987 20-21 (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON
TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE] (mortgage assets continue to dominate the thrift industry's
asset portfolio, but mortgage assets have declined from 85.63% of thrift industry assets in December
1977 to 69.68% in June 1987).
62. Id. at 21; Burke, Rhoades & Wolken, Thrift Institutions and Their New Powers, J. OF COM.
BANK LENDING, June 1987, at 43, 47-48 (In mid-1986 only 1.7% of FSLIC-insured institutions
invested assets in commercial and industrial loans compared with 19.6% of commercial bank assets
although the percentage of thrift assets invested in commercial and industrial loans has increased
from 1983 when it was only .2%).
Nor have state-chartered thrift institutions exercised their increased lending powers to any sig-
nificant extent. Arshadi, The Impact of Deregulation on S&Ls: Slow Use of New Opportunities, J.
RETAIL BANKING, Spring 1985, at 41, 47-47 (State-chartered thrift institutions in Florida and Texas
have expanded their consumer and commercial loans slowly and they do not yet represent a signifi-
cant percentage of their total assets.); Baker, Florida S&Ls' use of Expanded Powers, ECON. REv.
(Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta), 7, 15 (1982) ("[I]n the short-run Florida chartered associations have
done very little to exercise the expanded authorities their state statutes provide them."); Dunham &
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slightly greater percentage of their assets to nonmortgage consumer loans, but
the disparity between the actual percentage of assets of FSLIC-insured institu-
tions invested in consumer loans, 4.41% in 1987, and the authorized percentage,
30%, is even greater than in the case of commercial loans. 63 In fact, the thrift
institutions that have taken advantage of their new nonmortgage lending powers
have not fared well. In June 1987 insolvent thrifts held 40.01% of their asset
portfolio as nonmortgage assets while solvent thrifts held only 29% of their asset
portfolio as nonmortgage assets. 64 Apparently other institutions are meeting the
demand for nonmortgage loans at a lower cost. During the 1980s the percentage
Guerin-Clavert, How Quickly Can Thrifts Move Into Commercial Lending?, NEw ENG. ECON.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 42, 43, 54 (although commercial lending by mutual savings banks located
in the northeast rose from $79 million in 1980 to S538 million in 1982, on average only about one-
half of 1% of total assets of mutual savings banks were in commercial loans, and one-half of all New
England savings banks and an even greater percentage of savings and loans made no commercial
loans in 1982); McCall & Peterson, Changing Regulation in Retail Banking Services: The Evidence
from Maine, J. RETAIL BANKING, Sept. 1980, at 46, 54 (Participation by state-chartered thrift in-
stituions in the commercial loan market in Maine was very small.); see also Dunham, Mutual Sav-
ings Banks: Are They Now or Will They Ever Be Commercial Banks?, NEW ENG. ECON. REv., May-
June 1982, at 51, 61-62 (Mutual savings banks have long offered commercial loans under "leeway"
or "prudent loan" rules. In Connecticut commercial loans constituted 2.5% of mutual savings bank
assets in 1980. In New England, commercial loans made up 2.6% of mutual savings bank assets in
1980. In two New Hampshire markets, however, mutual savings banks had over 10% of assets
invested in commercial loans.).
Although in the aggregate thrift institutions have not taken advantage of their increased lending
powers, some indivudual thrift institutions now have portfolios that closely resemble those of com-
mercial banks. Burke, Rhoades & Wolken, supra, at 62 ("Disaggregated data suggest that many
banks and thrifts have similar loan-to-asset ratios, despite substantial differences in aggregate bal-
ance sheet ratios"); id. at 54 ("[T]here is a growing subset of banks and nonbank thrifts which hold
similar proportions of transactions accounts and commercial loans."); Roster, supra note 38, at
1104-05 (1985) (Although the "bulk of the industry remains traditional, notwithstanding the ex-
panded powers described above," some thrifts operate in retail, wholesale, or diversified form.); see
A. CARRON, Reforming the Bank Regulatory Structure 10 (1984) ("The differences in portfolio
structure between large and small banks is now often more pronounced than that between the small
banks and thrifts.").
Conversely, some commercial banks have conducted their operations in the manner of a tradi-
tional thrift institution, by specializing in mortgage lending. Eisenbeis, New Investments Powers for
S&Ls: Diversification or Specialization?, ECON. REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta), July 1983, at 53,
59 (specialization in real estate lending was profitable for commercial banks); see R. LITAN, supra
note 31, at 102-03 (some limited evidence on bank holding company profitability shows that the
operation of mortgage banking subsidiaries may be profitable for bank holding companies.).
63. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 35; Burke,
Rhoades & Wolken, supra note 62, at 47-49 (In 1982 only 1.3% of the assets of FSLIC-insured
institutions were invested in consumer loans.). For mutual savings banks, 3.4% of assets in June
1983 were in consumer loans compared with 5.7% of assets in June 1986. Id.; see also Mahoney &
White, supra note 31, at 149 (In mid-1984 virtually all FSLIC-insured institutions held some con-
sumer loans including home improvement loans and loans on savings accounts, while less than 40%
of such institutions held some form of commercial and industrial loans.).
64. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 36-37. In addition
to commercial and consumer loans, nonmortgage assets include direct investments (such as realty
held for development or equity in service corporations), Id. at 42-43, and investment securities, id. at
48-49.
Although the 1980 and 1982 legislation were enacted to strengthen thrifts, the aggregate finan-
cial condition of the thrift industry has continued to decline. In 1987 the thrift industry lost $7.8
billion. 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1105 (1988). In June 1987 over 15% of all institutions insured by
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) were insolvent although only 4%
were insolvent in June 1982. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61,
at 11. Moreover, FSLIC is also insolvent. 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 693 (1988) (at year-end 1987,
the FHLBB calculated FSLIC's negative net worth to be $11.6 billion); 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 40
(1988) (the GAO estimated FSLIC's negative net worth to be $13.7 billion). Private analysts predict
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of commercial bank assets devoted to commercial loans decreased dramati-
cally,65 as many large corporations have turned to the commercial paper market
as a lower cost source of working capital than short-term bank or thrift loans.
66
Consumer loans also are now provided by sellers of consumer goods engaged in
direct financing of consumer purchases. 67 Thus, the demand for commercial
and consumer loans from commercial banks decreased at the same time that
thrift institutions were authorized to provide these loans. In addition, significant
costs are associated with entering new lending markets. 6 8 Some observers have
noted that thrift institutions historically lacked the management expertise to
make commercial loans, 69 and the start-up costs of establishing such expertise
may well be high. 70
Many thrift institutions have been able to maintain an adequate perform-
ance in their traditional lines of business without exercising their new lending
powers. Notwithstanding the common impression that thrifts are financially
that it will cost some $100 billion for FSLIC to save all insolvent thrift institutions. 51 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 655 (1988).
65. Banking Week, June 6, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (Since 1984, commercial lending, formerly the
"bread and butter of banking," has become virtually obsolete.). In 1984 growth in commercial loans
accounted for 50% of the growth in short-term business borrowing. In contrast, in 1988 growth in
commercial loans represented only 23% of the growth in short-term business borrowing. Id. at 8,
col. 1. At the beginning of 1988, however, corporations increased their short-term bank borrowing.
Id. at 1. This trend is expected to continue. Sudo & Cacace, Growing Business Loan Market Slips
Past Big Banks' Reach, Banking Week, June 27, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
66. Banking Week, June 6, 1988, at 1, col. 4 ("Since 1984, the nation's largest banks catering to
the largest businesses have steadily lost many of their traditional customers to the commercial paper
market, which offers more advantageous pricing."); id., May 31, 1988, at 1 ("The two biggest blows
to corporate lending business at commercial banks have been commercial paper and junk bonds.").
67. Seger, Financial Markets and Reform, in EXPANDED COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND THE
THRIFT INDUSTRY 19, 21 (1987) ("[M]ore and more consumers are obtaining car loans from the
automobile companies, rather than going to their bank, thrift, or credit union.").
68. F. BALDERSTON, supra note 30, at 157 ("Each new activity requires set-up costs as well as
variable costs."); Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 148 ("The considerable start-up costs... may
have deterred many institutions from exercising these new powers."); see F. BALDERSTON, supra
note 30, at 157 ("The difficulties of new market entry are, of course, reduced to the extent that the
financial firm hires exceptionally experienced and competent managers for a new division, and to the
extent that top management itself develops capabilities for effective oversight.").
69. COMMERCIAL LENDING BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS: A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 4
(Robert Morris Assoc. 1984) (manual emphasizing expertise differences in establishing commercial
loans as opposed to retail loans); Dunham & Guerin-Calvert, supra note 62, at 47-48 (differences in
institutional experience might make commercial lending more expensive for thrifts than it is for
commercial banks); Savage, supra note 35, at 201 ("Few thrifts have developed the expertise in the
already highly competitive area of commercial lending."); see Eisenbeis, supra note 62, at 62 (Exper-
tise problems with commercial lending could be solved by engaging in commercial loan participa-
tions with commercial banks or other savings and loan associations.).
70. Burke, Rhoades & Wolken, supra note 62, at 49; see Dunham & Guerin-Calvert, supra note
62, at 47 ("Several factors suggest that at least some thrifts may have higher commercial lending
costs than commercial banks."); Fortier & Phillis, supra note 59, at 65 ("Survey results of S&Ls in
Illinois and Wisconsin indicate that few... are willing to take the associated risks and are able to
surmount the start-up cQsts of entering the business of commercial lending." (footnote omitted)); see
also C. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & R. SCOTT, supra note 31, at 119 ("It would be difficult for many
thrifts, especially small ones, to make many business loans because of the expertise needed, and
competing with commercial banks to make such loans would be relatively difficult."). Nor is it likely
thrift institutions with weak capital positions and poor earnings will expand into a new line of busi-
ness. Burke, Rhoades & Wolken, supra note 62, at 48 (poor earnings may account for failure of
thrifts to expand into commercial lending); Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 150 (Expansion into
new lending opportunities may be hampered by the weak capital position of thrifts.).
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troubled, the majority of thrift institutions are profitable.7 1 Only fifteen percent
of these institutions account for the staggering losses suffered by the thrift indus-
try.72 Thrift institutions that have remained concentrated in traditional thrift
activities generally have experienced more successful earnings performance. 73
As one economist suggested, "S&Ls may not have to become clones of commer-
cial banks in order to operate successfully. In fact, they may even continue to
exploit their existing expertise as specialized mortgage lenders with the expecta-
tion of being as profitable as more diversified lenders." 74 Moreover, the demand
for home mortgage loans has increased in the 1980s as mortgage interest rates
have decreased. 75 Finally, there are also several significant incentives for thrift
institutions to concentrate the majority of their assets in housing-related invest-
ments. A thrift that maintains a high percentage of its loan portfolio in home
mortgage loans or mortgage-backed securities is eligible for certain benefits re-
71. Thrifts located in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas account for "'nearly half of all insol-
vent institutions and 80 percent of the losses at all insolvent institutions in the first quarter [of
1988].' " 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1105 (1988) (quoting James Barth, chief economist of the
FHLBB); accord GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 16 ("The
improvement [in thrift performance] in the 1980s is due to the superior performance of the healthier
thrifts and has occurred despite the insolvent thrifts' declining net worth ratio ....").
72. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 10-11 (As of June
1987, 15.39% of FSLIC-insured institutions had a net worth less than or equal to zero.); 50 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 694 (1988) (Trade groups and the FHLBB estimate that 80% of thrift institutions are
healthy.).
73. The General Accounting Office reported:
Over the last decade, insolvent thrifts have consistently held fewer mortgage assets as a
percent of total assets than have the higher net worth thrifts. As of June 1987, insolvent
thrifts were holding approximately 60 percent mortgage assets as a percent of total assets
while thrifts in the other two [higher] net worth categories were holding slightly more than
70 percent.
GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 24.
74. Eisenbeis, supra note 62, at 62. In addition, thrift institutions have increasingly used varia-
ble-rate mortgages and securitization of their mortgage loan portfolios to help alleviate the interest
rate risk inherent in making long-term home mortgage loans funded by short-term deposits. GAO
REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 3 (mortgage-backed securities and
variable rate mortgage instruments have been the "dominant mortgage asset portfolio change of this
decade"); id. at 33 (Only 5.72% of all assets of FSLIC-insured institutions were held as adjustable
rate mortgages in June 1982, although 30.59% of assets were held in adjustable rate mortgages in
June 1987.); Burke, Roades & Wolken, supra note 62, at 49: Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at
145; Simpson, supra note 30, at 10.
Many thrifts hold a greater percentage of their mortgage-related assets in mortgage-backed
securities instead of mortgage loans than in prior years. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT
PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 22-23 (In June 1987, 14.97% of the assets of FSLIC-insured insti-
tutions were invested in mortgage-backed securities, compared with 6.96% of assets in mortgage-
backed securities in June 1982.); Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 146 (Since 1978, "[t]he most
dramatic change... in the composition of mortgage assets of thrift institutions has been an increase,
from 3.7 percent to more than 15 percent, in the proportion of these assets that FSLIC-insured
institutions hold as mortgage-backed securities."). A lender may originate and then pool together a
number of home mortgage loans. The mortgages in the pool serve as collateral for securities that are
issued to purchasers, including thrift institutions. Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 146. By
purchasing these securities, thrift institutions may invest deposits in housing-related assets with a
much shorter term than traditional home mortgage loans. GAO REPORT ON TRENDS IN THRIFT
PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, at 22 ("Although thrifts receive a lower yield on [mortgage-backed
securities] than they would if they held the mortgage loans directly, [mortgage-backed securities] do
provide other advantages, including greater liquidity and ready collateral for borrowing purposes.");
Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 146; Simpson, supra note 30, at 9-10.
75. Burke, Rhoades & Wolken, supra note 62, at 49; Mahoney & White, supra note 31, at 148.
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lating to branching, 76 the scope of activities of its affiliated companies, 77 and tax
treatment.78 These benefits are not available to thrift institutions that do not
concentrate in home mortgage lending.
Thus, thrift institutions have not extensively engaged in the new lending
powers authorized for them in 1980 and 1982. Thrifts and banks have lost loan
business to nondepository institutions that are able to provide funds at lower
costs. The institutions that have increased their nonmortgage loans have exper-
ienced earning problems, while thrifts that have continued to concentrate their
assets in home mortgage loans have performed relatively well. The effect of the
statutory enhancement of thrift powers on the lending activities of thrifts has'so
far not been great. As the next Part demonstrates, however, the increases in
thrift powers have significantly affected the market expansion opportunities of
banks and bank holding companies.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF ENHANCED THRIFT POWERS ON BANK AND BANK
HOLDING COMPANY MARKET EXPANSION
A bank may expand its market within a state by establishing a new branch
or by combining with an existing commercial bank through merger or acquisi-
tion. New branches for state banks may be established only as permitted by
state law, 79 and new branches for national banks may only be established pursu-
ant to the McFadden Act in those locations allowed by state law to institutions
carrying on the banking business. 80 A merger between two banks may not be
consummated without the approval of the appropriate federal banking agency.8 1
In conducting the review the federal banking agency considers, among other
factors, the possible effect of the merger on competition in the relevant geo-
graphic market.82
A bank holding company may expand its market by the acquisition of an
additional bank subsidiary. Such an acquisition must be approved by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act. 83 If the bank
to be acquired operates in the same market as an existing bank subsidiary, the
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). A federally chartered thrift institution may estab-
lish a branch in a state other than the state of its principal office if the institution meets the Internal
Revenue Code's definition of a domestic building and loan association. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7701(a)(19)
(Supp. IV 1986) (60% of assets must be committed to mortgage-related investments).
77. The nonthrift subsidiaries of a savings and loan holding company that owns only one sav-
ings and loan are exempt from the nonthrift activity restrictions applicable to savings and loan hold-
ing companies that own more than one savings and loan under the SLHCA, so long as the thrift
subsidiary satisfies the "qualified thrift lender" test. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(o)(I) (West Supp. 1988).
To be a qualified thrift lender, the thrift institution must have 60% of its assets invested in mortgage-
related investments. Id. § 1730a(o)(1), (5).
78. A thrift institution that has 60% of its assets committed to mortgage-related investments,
as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(19) (1982) may deduct 5% of its income as an addition to its reserve
for bad debts. I.R.C. § 593 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (a significantly greater percentage of income
deduction was allowed until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended this provision).
79. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
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antitrust review discussed in connection with a bank merger must be conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board.84 If the bank to be acquired operates outside the
state where the bank holding company's bank subsidiaries currently operate, the
acquisition must comply with the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act.85 The Douglas Amendment prohibits interstate acquisitions un-
less specifically authorized by the target bank's state.8 6 Many states have en-
acted legislation in the 1980s permitting such interstate acquisitions, at least to a
limited extent.87 Finally, a bank holding company may expand its market by
the acquisition of a nonbanking subsidiary whose activities are closely related
and a proper incident to banking. 88 The Douglas Amendment does not limit the
permissible locations of nonbanking subsidiaries. 89
The enhancement of thrift powers has affected all of these methods of bank
and bank holding company market expansion, other than interstate banking
pursuant to the Douglas Amendment. Each method merits separate discussion,
however, because different legal standards are applicable to each. The next three
sections deal with each of the three affected methods of market expansion. Each
section describes the legal analysis applicable to the particular market expansion
method and the changes in the application of that analysis as a result of the
enhancement of thrift powers. Each section then considers whether the change
in application is warranted, especially considering the fact that few thrifts have
exercised their bank-like lending powers to a significant extent.
A. Commercial Bank Market Expansion by the Establishment of a Branch
A commercial bank may seek to expand its operations within a state by
establishing a branch. Historically, courts rejected approvals of branch applica-
tions filed by national banks seeking to establish branches in locations allowed to
state thrifts, but not allowed to state commercial banks.90 Recent court deci-
sions, however, have allowed national banks to establish branches in the same
locations permitted to state-chartered thrift institutions in states where thrifts
have been found to be carrying on the banking business pursuant to state law.9 1
These decisions are explained by the statutory enhancement of thrift powers in
the early years of this decade. 92 This section examines these decisions and con-
cludes that the decisions represent a proper application of the legal framework
relating to bank branching in the light of the enhancement of thrift powers. The
section concludes that the decisions are proper even though thrifts in the aggre-
gate have not yet taken advantage of their enhanced lending powers to a signifi-
84. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982); see infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (applies only to bank holding company acquisitions of banks).
90. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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cant extent.93
1. State Bank and National Bank Branching Restrictions
A state-chartered bank may branch as permitted by state law. The states
have adopted various branching schemes ranging from no branching (sometimes
referred to as unit banking), to limited branching within a specified geographic
area (such as a city or a county or within a certain radius of a bank's principal
office), to statewide branching. 94 Only a few states have legislation that would
permit a bank located outside the state to establish a branch within the state.95
A national bank wishing to establish a branch is subject to the McFadden
Act, which amended the National Bank Act to provide limited branching oppor-
tunities for national banks.96 As originally enacted, the National Bank Act pro-
vided no authority for a national bank to establish a branch. 97 When state banks
began to branch to a limited extent, however, fear of national banks converting
to state charters to take advantage of the state bank branching privileges led to
the enactment of the McFadden Act in 1927.98 The Act now provides in section
36(c) that a national bank may establish a branch anywhere within the state in
which it is located, if state law specifically grants a state bank the authority to
establish a branch at that location.99 The Act only contemplates branching by a
93. See infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
94. See I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 3106 (1987) (collecting the branching statutes of each
state); 1 W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 5.01 (1986) (same); see also
Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677
(1988) (branching restrictions at the state level "restrict output and raise prices for consumers").
95. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, § 39 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (regional reciprocal
interstate branching authorization that is ineffective because none of the states in the designated
region currently have a reciprocal interstate branching provision); NEV. REV. STAT. § 666.305(2)
(1986) (a depository institution whose home office is located outside of Nevada "may establish a
branch office in a county [in Nevada) whose population is less than 100,000").
96. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982)); see
generally DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANK-
ING IN THE UNITED STATES (1981) (report to the President on the applicability of the McFadden
Act in the current financial environment).
97. It was assumed, from the absence of specific legislative authorization, that national banks
could not branch. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 720; see First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,
659 (1924) (states may prohibit branching by a national bank because branching not a "necessary
incident of a banking business" under federal law).
98. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927). In the early 1900s some states began to
allow their banks to branch within the county of their principal office. E. WHITE, THE REGULA-
TION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM, 1900-1929 156-60 (1983). In a report to
Congress recommending congressional action on national bank branching, the Comptroller stated
that "if state banks continue to engage 'in unlimited branch banking it will mean the eventual de-
struction of the national banking system.'" First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S.
252, 257 (1966) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924)); see Langevoort, supra
note 30, at 721 (Congress feared that if national banks converted to state charters, the Federal Re-
serve System, which national banks were required to join, would suffer.).
The McFadden Act was viewed as a victory for those who wished to limit the branching oppor-
tunities of national banks. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 721-22. Congressman McFadden described
the bill as an antibranch banking measure. 68 CONG. REC. 2166 (1927); see H. BURNS, THE AMERI-
CAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS 1933-1935 53-61 (1974) (discus-
sion of the post-enactment branching controversy).
99. The McFadden Act provides, in relevant part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of Currency,
establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in
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national bank "within the state" and thus does not permit interstate branch-
ing. 100 Congressional intent, according to the Supreme Court, was "to place na-
tional and state banks on a basis of 'competitive equality' insofar as branch
banking was concerned." 10 1 The notion of competitive equality "reflects the
congressional concern that neither [the state nor the federal] system have advan-
tages over the other in the use of branch banking."102
The McFadden Act is not concerned with the wisdom of a state's banking
limitations, but rather defers to state law to determine whether, where, and by
what method a national bank may establish a branch. 10 3 The reference to state
law in section 36(c) of the McFadden Act implements that congressional intent
and is a "self-executing provision to accommodate to changes 'in state
regulation."' 104
which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time ex-
pressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point
within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation
are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by
language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication
or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State
on State banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
Congress broadened the McFadden Act to its present scope in 1933. Banking Act of 1933, ch.
89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90 (1933). Previously, it limited national banks and federal reserve mem-
ber banks to branching within the city, if such branching was allowed to state banks. The push for
expansion of branching privileges for national banks was, in part, a result of the economic depression
of the 1930s. Proponents hoped that broad branching opportunities would encourage large, strong
banks to establish branches that would replace smaller, undercapitalized, rural banks that many felt
contributed to the number of depression-era bank failures. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966); H. BURNS, supra note 98, at 56 (expanded branching opportunities
would increase competition, eliminate weak competitors, and thereby strengthen the banking sys-
tem); Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 1154.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1982).
101. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966).
102. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969); see Butler & Macey, supra note 94,
at 702 ("The greatest impact of the competitive equality doctrine is its restrictions on the ability of
national banks to branch.").
103. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. at 261-62 (a national bank may establish a branch only
in accordance with all the requirements and conditions applicable to state banks by state law). Pro-
fessor Langevoort explained:
[T]he Act represented the judgment of Congress that in general it was appropriate as a
matter of regulatory policy to limit geographic expansion. The reasons for this determina-
tion vary; no doubt special-interest pressure for home market protection was a (probably
the) dominant factor. But the legislative history expresses facially legitimate-though not
necessarily persuasive--"public-regarding" concerns as well, and it is likely that these in
fact played an honest role in the formulation of the law. Foremost among them was the
channeling objective: promoting local reinvestment of deposits by preserving local control
over banking institutions, thus avoiding the drain of funds from remote regions to the
money centers that was feared if authority over use of the funds was placed in a distant
bank headquarters. Closely related was the desire to avoid concentrating too much eco-
nomic power in money-center banking institutions, quite apart from where the money was
used. Closing local markets to expansion by growth-oriented banks would indirectly ac-
complish this. Statutory interpretation of the McFadden Act that seeks to adhere to the
legislative intent could legitimately use these considerations as touchstones of legislative
purpose.
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 723 (footnotes omitted). But see Butler & Macey, supra note 94, at 703
(the McFadden Act "stabilizes the regulatory cartel and, in fact, limits competition").
104. Dickinson, 396 U.S. at 133.
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While deferring to state branching schemes, Congress also included specific
definitions of "branch" in section 36(f) and "State bank" in section 36(h).105
"State bank" is defined "to include trust companies, savings banks, or other such
corporations or institutions carrying on the banking business under the author-
ity of State laws."106 Prior to the early 1980s most state-chartered thrift institu-
tions were not considered to be carrying on the banking business because they
lacked the statutory authority to make commercial loans and nonmortgage con-
sumer loans and could not provide checking accounts or equivalent transaction
accounts.107 National bank branching was, therefore, limited to branching op-
portunities available to state-chartered commercial banks, although many states
afforded state-chartered thrift institutions broader branching privileges than
state-chartered banks.10 8
2. National Bank Branching Decisions Prior to the
Enhancement of Thrift Powers
The 1979 opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Mutschler v. Peoples National Bank of Washington 109 illustrates the ap-
105 12 U.S.C. § 36(f), (h) (1982). "Branch" is defined to include any "place of business... at
which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." Id. § 36(f).
106. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7(h), 44 Stat. 1224, 1229 (1927) (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(h) (1982)). See generally Griffin, Branching by National Banks: Must the "(h)" Always be
Silent?, 3 J.L. & COM. 243 (1983) (discussing the proper interpretation of the "state bank" definition
in § 36(h) of the McFadden Act).
107. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
108. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6-101(1) (1987) (state banks may not branch) with id.
§ 11-41-120 (state savings and loan associations may branch with approval of commissioner); Com-
pare IND. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-13-19, -20 (Burns Supp. 1988) (state banks may branch in same
county as home office or in counties contiguous to county of home office) with id. § 28-4-3-2 (state
building and loan associations may branch statewide); compare MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.710(171)
(Callaghan Supp. 1988) (state banks may branch within same city or county as home office, within
25 miles of home office, or in counties contiguous to county of home office) with id. § 23.602(522)
(Callaghan 1983) (state savings and loan associations may branch statewide with approval of com-
missioner); compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105.1(1) (Vernon 1986) (state banks may not branch)
with id. § 369.329 (state savings and loan associations may branch with approval of commissioner);
compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-614 (1980) (state banks may branch in same county as home
office) with id. 45-3-301 (1980) (state savings and loan associations may branch statewide if chartered
for five years); compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 221.040) (West 1982) (state bank may branch within 25
miles of home office or in same county as home office, whichever is greater) vith id. §§ 215.13(39),
.21(2) (Vest Supp. 1980) (state savings and loan associations may branch within "normal lending
area" (100 mile radius)).
One possible explanation for the disparity in branching privileges many states have granted to
the different types of depository institutions may be that federal regulations provide that federally
chartered thrifts may branch freely throughout a state and, in some circumstances, across state lines.
12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(2) (1988) ("As a general policy, the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board permits
a Federal association to branch within the state in which its home office is located."); see 12
U.S.C.A. § 1464(r) (West Supp. 1988); see also 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(3) (1988) (circumstances in
which interstate branching by federal thrift institutions permitted). Congress has specifically de-
clined to adopt a McFadden Act equivalent requiring federal deference to state branching laws appli-
cable to state-chartered thrifts. See United States v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp. 690,
698 n.5 (E.D. Wis.) (detailing failed legislative attempts to introduce a McFadden-type statute into
the laws relating to branching by federally chartered savings and loan associations),judgment modi-
fied, 284 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958). No doubt state legislatures
were mindful of the possibility that state thrifts might convert to federal branching entitilements if
the states were not similarly generous in affording branching rights to state-chartered thrifts.
109. 607 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1979); see also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Empie, No. 78-296-C,
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proach taken by the courts prior to the statutory enhancement of thrift powers.
In Mutschler, a national bank applied to the Comptroller of the Currency, the
federal banking regulator charged with the supervision of national banks, for
permission to relocate a branch to an unincorporated area in a county other than
the county of the bank's principal place of business. Washington state law re-
stricted branching by a state-chartered bank outside the bank's home county to
incorporated cities and towns.110 State-chartered mutual savings banks, how-
ever, were authorized to establish branches in any county in the state."' The
national bank argued that it was entitled to branch to the same extent as a "state
bank," that the McFadden Act defined a "state bank" to include a savings bank,
and that the national bank therefore should be entitled to establish a branch at
any location in the state at which a state-chartered savings bank could establish
a branch. 112
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, ignoring the definition of "state
bank" in section 36(h) and relying on section 36(c)'s general deference to state
law." t 3 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because national bank branching is
only permitted if expressly authorized by state law, a national bank wishing to
branch in the manner authorized for a state mutual savings bank under state law
must satisfy all the provisions of the state statute and show that it engages itself
exclusively as a mutual savings bank.114 The national bank did not engage itself
exclusively as a mutual savings bank and thus was denied mutual savings bank
branching privileges.15 A contrary holding, the court stated, would give na-
tional banks a "rather significant competitive advantage" over state-chartered
commercial banks."16
The Ninth Circuit noted that the increasing overlap in services offered by
mutual savings banks and commercial banks was diminishing the traditional dif-
ferences between the two types of institutions, but remained convinced that, in
1979, a mutual savings bank was a "separate and distinct legislative creation"
from a state commercial bank." 7 Although not specifically discussed in the
opinion, Washington mutual savings banks actually were not authorized to
(E.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 1982), appeal dismissed, No. 83-1071 (10th Cir. 1983), reprinted in 2 H. Pi-r,
D. MILES & A. AIN, supra note 22, app. B-3 (holding that a national bank was not entitled to
establish a branch in the same locations available to a state-chartered trust company, in part because
of the striking differences between trust companies and commercial banks); State Chartered Banks v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180, 199 (W.D. Wash. 1966) (holding that a national bank was not
entitled to establish a branch in the same locations available to a state-chartered mutual savings bank
because the national bank did not "satisfy all the provisions of [the] statute" relating to the operation
of a mutual savings bank).
110. Mutschler, 607 F.2d at 279 (This was an interpretation of Washington statutory law made
by the Washington Supreme Court in Hart v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d 197, 203-02, 558





115. Id. The court did not consider the specific language of § 36(h), which seems to raise the
possible argument that a savings bank is a "state bank" whether or not it is carrying on the banking
business. See infra note 106.
116. Mutschler, 607 F.2d at 279.
117. Id. at 280.
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make commercial loans at the time of the decision.' 1 8
3. National Bank Branching Decisions After the
Enhancement of Thrift Powers
More recent judicial interpretations of section 36(h), however, allow na-
tional banks to establish branches within a state to the same extent that state law
authorizes state-chartered thrift institutions to establish branches.119 The lead-
ing case is Department of Banking and Consumer Finance v. Clarke (Deposit
Guaranty), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that Mississippi-chartered thrift institutions were "state banks" for pur-
poses of the McFadden Act because they were "'carrying on the banking busi-
ness under the authority of State laws.' ",120 Deposit Guaranty National Bank
applied to the Comptroller for permission to establish a branch in a location that
would not have been permitted for a state-chartered commercial bank seeking to
branch.121 Mississippi law, however, authorized state-chartered thrift institu-
tions to branch statewide. 122 Deposit Guaranty's application to the Comptroller
alleged that Mississippi thrifts were carrying on the banking business under the
authority of state law and thus met the definition of "state bank" in section
36(h) of the McFadden Act.' 23 The Comptroller agreed and granted the bank
permission to establish the branch.
124
The Fifth Circuit upheld the Comptroller's approval of the branch applica-
tion.' 25 In determining whether Mississippi thrift institutions were engaged in
118. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 32.20.230 (1961) (loans may be secured by collateral securi-
ties or real estate mortgages); id. § 32.20.240 (loans may be secured by pledge of passbook); id.
§ 32.30.250 (loans may be secured by real estate mortgages). Washington mutual savings banks were
able to offer NOW accounts to consumers, however. Washington Bankers Ass'n v. Washington
Mutual Say. Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 453, 598 P.2d 719 (1979).
119. Department of Banking and Consumer Fin. v. Clarke (Deposit Guaranty), 809 F.2d 266
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3240 (1987); Texas v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
Volunteer State Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 684 F. Supp. 964, 967 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (the
court took "judicial notice of the dramatic changes that have occurred in recent years in the financial
industry, and in particular, of the expanded powers and competitive advertising of thrift institutions
in their successful attempt to engage in the 'banking business' "). A similar lawsuit is pending in
Florida. Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Office of the Comptroller, No. 88-8225-Civil-Payne (S.D. Fla.).
120. 809 F.2d 266, 270 (5th Cir.) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 36(h) (1982)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3240 (1987).
121. Id. at 267-68. Mississippi law then provided that a state-chartered commercial bank could
establish a branch only in the county in which the bank's principal office was located or within 100
miles of the bank's principal office. Deposit Guaranty, however, wished to establish a branch more
than 100 miles from its main office and in a different county. Id.
122. Id. at 268.
123. Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application of Deposit Guaranty Nat'l
Bank, Jackson, Miss., to Establish a Branch Office in Gulfport, Miss. (July 9, 1985), reprinted in 2 H.
PITT, D. MILES & A. AIN, supra note 22, app. at E-10, E-10.4 (1988) [hereinafter Decision of the
Comptroller on Deposit Guaranty].
124. Id. at E-10.31.
125. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d 266. The Comptroller's decision was challenged by the Missis-
sippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the Comptroller's decision could not be upheld because it
would force states to change their branching provisions to protect state-chartered banks, contrary to
the McFadden Act's purpose of preserving parity in the dual banking system. Department of Bank-
ing and Consumer Fin. v. Selby, 617 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Miss. 1985), rev'dsub nom Dep't of Banking
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the "banking business," the court noted that "the language of § 36(h) expressly
requires a consideration of function." 126 Although there is no explicit federal
definition of "banking business," the court looked for guidance to the relevant
powers and functions of a national bank enumerated in the National Bank Act:
(1) the receiving of deposits; (2) the loaning of money on personal security; and
(3) the discounting and negotiating of promissory notes, drafts, bills of ex-
change, and other evidences of debt. 127 The Fifth Circuit concluded that "the
banking business, reduced to essentials, involves receiving deposits, making com-
mercial loans, and negotiating checks and drafts."'
128
The ability of thrifts to provide products and services functionally
equivalent to those traditionally associated with commercial banking, the Fifth
Circuit noted, was the result of dramatic changes in Mississippi law beginning in
1980.129 Those changes granted to state-chartered savings and loan associations
the same powers available to federally chartered savings and loans, which may
receive deposits, make commercial loans, and negotiate checks (drawn on de-
mand deposits held by commercial loan customers) and drafts (negotiable orders
of withdrawal drawn on NOW accounts held by consumers). 1 30 The Comptrol-
ler found that Mississippi-chartered thrift institutions "now offer a range of
products and services" that constitute the business of banking and concluded
and Consumer Fin. v. Clarke (Deposit Guaranty), 809 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3240 (1987).
126. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 270. As the court noted, this functional analysis is also
consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Clarke v. Security Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750, 753,
762 (1987), holding that offices of a discount brokerage operation of a national bank did not consti-
tute "branches" of the national bank subject to the locational limitations of the McFadden Act
because such offices did not engage in the core banking functions enumerated in the McFadden Act's
definition of branch: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. Deposit Guaranty, 809
F.2d at 270.
Moreover, the court concluded that the concept of competitive equality underlying the McFad-
den Act mandated that "state bank" and "banking business" be defined by federal law. Id. at 269-70.
The court endorsed the Comptroller's analysis that "'competitive equality requires a federal defini-
tion of "State bank" to prevent states from disadvantaging national banks vis-a-vis state-chartered
institutions [merely by not] denominating these institutions "banks" and treating them somewhat
differently from state commercial banks, though not so differently as to prevent these institutions
from competing with national banks.'" Id. at 270 (quoting from Decision of the Comptroller on
Deposit Guaranty, supra note 123). The Decision of the Comptroller on Deposit Guaranty, supra
note 123, at E-10.12, and the Fifth Circuit misquote the original source of this proposition, Griffin,
supra note 106, at 246, although it is clear from the context that both endorse the correct quotation,
which appears above as bracketed.
127. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 268 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1982)); see Decision of,
the Comptroller on Deposit Guaranty, supra note 123, app. at E-10.22.
128. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 268. Later in its opinion the Fifth Circuit stated the defini-
tion of the "banking business" more broadly: "the business of banking, stripped to its essentials, [is]
accepting deposits, paying checks, and making loans." Id. at 270.
129. Id. at 268.
130. Id.; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-12-49(r) (Supp. 1987) ("wild card" law that permits a Mis-
sissippi savings association to engage in any activity permitted a federally chartered savings and loan
association located in Mississippi). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Garn-St Germain Act
of 1982, while expanding the powers of savings and loan associations, preserved the principal differ-
ence between commercial banks and thrift institutions-that being "the limits placed on the com-
mercial and consumer loans and investments of the savings institutions, designed to protect their
capacity to make needed home loans." Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 271. But the court found that
the legislative distinction "neither proscribes the functional analysis made by the Comptroller nor
militates against his interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 36(h)." Id.
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that Mississippi thrift institutions were in fact carrying on the business of bank-
ing under authority of state laws. 131 Upholding the Comptroller's decision, the
Fifth Circuit found that the "Comptroller's factual determination that the sav-
ings associations are engaged in the banking business is amply supported by the
record."1 32
4. Evaluation of Recent National Bank Branching Decisions
The Deposit Guaranty decision, granting a national bank the same branch-
ing privileges available to a Mississippi thrift, is correct in the light of the en-
hancement of thrift powers in Mississippi according those institutions the
functions traditionally associated with commercial banks. The validity of the
decision, of course, depends on a proper interpretation of the McFadden Act.
This rests on a correct resolution of three critical issues presented by section
36(h) of the Act, namely, (1) what is the role of the federal definition of "state
bank" in the light of federal deference to a state's branching scheme, (2) what
constitutes the "banking business" under the Act, and (3) what is the meaning of
the requirement that the institution be "carrying on" the banking business?
These issues shall now be discussed in turn.
Notwithstanding the McFadden Act's deference in section 36(c) to a state's
branching scheme, Deposit Guaranty is correct that the federal definition of
"state bank" in section 36(h) must be utilized.1 33 Indeed, in 1969 the Supreme
Court held that a federal definition of "branch" set forth in section 36(f) was
equally important to effectuating Congress' intent in the McFadden Act: "Con-
gress entrusted to the States the regulation of branching as Congress then con-
ceived it. But to allow the states to define the content of the term 'branch' would
make them the sole judges of their own powers."' 134
Absent a federal definition of "state bank," a state could call a state-
chartered bank by some other name, such as a "financial services institution,"
grant it statewide branching authority, but prohibit branching for state-
chartered "banks," and thus prohibit national bank branching.'" 5 The federal
definition of "state bank" based on the functions associated with the banking
business as set forth in section 36(h) obviously was intended to prevent such a
result. Thus, section 36(c) preserves competitive equality between national
131. Decision of the Comptroller on Deposit Guaranty, supra note 123, app. at E-10.29-.31 (re-
lying on a consultant's report that thrift institutions in Mississippi "are currently offering a range of
products and services in competition with commercial banks, including NOW accounts, auto and
other consumer loans, construction loans, and commercial loans").
132. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 271 (stating that the Comptroller's factual determination was
"supported by the record," was "neither arbitrary nor capricious," and was "patently correct").
133. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
134. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133 (1969) (holding that a national bank may
not establish an armored car messenger service or an off-site deposit receptacle because each would
constitute a "branch" as defined in § 36(f) of the McFadden Act and could not be established pursu-
ant to Florida state law that prohibited state bank branching).
135. See supra note 126; see also Griffin, supra note 106, at 255 ("It would further appear that
one significant purpose of including an express definition of 'State bank' in section 36 was to prevent
states from disadvantaging national banks by permitting state institutions with broader branching
power than national banks to engage in the substance of banking business, under another 'form.' ").
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banks and "state banks" as specifically defined in section 36(h), not just between
national banks and state-chartered commercial banks. 136 If Congress had in-
tended the latter approach, there would be no need for a separate definition of
"state bank." The Mutschler court mistakenly ignored the federal definition of
"state bank" in section 36(h) and relied solely on section 36(c)'s deference to
state law to find that a national bank wishing to branch like a state mutual
savings bank must satisfy all of the provisions of the state mutual savings bank
statutes.' 37 Even had the Mutschler court applied section 36(h), it probably
would have reached the same result because Washington mutual savings banks
were not then authorized to provide all the functions associated with commer-
cial banking. 138
Addressing the second issue raised by section 36(h), the Fifth Circuit in
Deposit Guaranty offered a definition of the phrase "banking business" based on
the functions associated with banks as set forth in section 24 of the National
Bank Act's enumeration of the powers of a national bank "necessary to carry on
the business of banking." 139 Given the similarity of section 36(h)'s reference to
"banking business" and section 24's "business of banking," it is logical to con-
clude that the terms are coterminous. 140 The functions of banking enumerated
in section 24 include receiving deposits, paying checks, and making loans on
personal security, which since the 1980s have been available to thrift institutions
in many states.14 Thus, in those states that have authorized thrifts to engage in
these functions, finding that state thrifts carry on the banking business and are
therefore "state banks" is a proper construction of the McFadden Act.
Allowing national banks to establish branches in locations permitted for
state thrift branches but not state bank branches may seem unfair to state banks.
For instance, in Mississippi, a national bank may now establish a branch any-
where throughout the state, but state bank branching restrictions more narrowly
constrain a state bank's branch locations.' 42 The purpose of the McFadden Act,
however, is to preserve competitive equality between national banks and all state
institutions carrying on the banking business under the authority of state law,
136. Texas v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp. 573, 580 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("The competitive equality guar-
anteed by the McFadden Act is mandated between national banks and 'state banks' not national
banks and Texas commercial banks."); Griffin, supra note 106, at 251.
137. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text; see also Griffin, supra note 106, at 248
(Mutschler's "root fallacy" is to "import deference to state law into the definitional subsection where
such deference is not expressed and does not belong").
138. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. A state trust company or savings bank should
not be considered a "state bank" unless it is also "carries on the 'banking business under the author-
ity of State laws.'" See Griffin, supra note 106, at 258. This interpretation effectuates the competi-
tive equality principle because allowing a national bank to branch to the same extent as a trust
company or a savings bank would only preserve competitive equality if the trust company or savings
bank were carrying on the banking business and thus offering competition to the national bank.
Moreover, it has been suggested that trust companies and savings banks were separately listed in the
statute because those were then common names of state commercial banks. Id.
139. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
140. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (seventh) (West Supp. 1988) (enacted by National Bank Act of 1864, ch.
106, 13 Stat. 99 (amending and incorporating the National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat.
665)).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 40-58.
142. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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not just state commercial banks. 143 Any potential unfairness to state commer-
cial banks as a result of the Deposit Guaranty decision stems only from the irra-
tionality of a state's regulation of depository institutions and their branching
opportunities, rendering functionally similar institutions subject to different
branching restrictions.
A state attempting to restore some rationality to its regulatory structure has
several alternative courses of action. It may return to the pre-Deposit Guaranty
days by legislatively restricting the powers of state thrifts so that they may no
longer be said to be carrying on the banking business. This course of action,
however, is not likely as state lawmakers may justifiably fear an exodus of state
thrift institutions to the federal thrift charter and its more liberal powers. A
second alternative is to preserve a system in which state banks may not branch
as extensively as national banks. This alternative is also unattractive because
states may fear the conversion of state banks to national bank charters for addi-
tional branching privileges. As a final alternative, a state may choose to expand
state bank branching opportunities to make them equal to those available to
state thrifts. Several states have already taken this course of action.1 44
The final issue in interpreting section 36(h) is what meaning to give the
requirement that an institution be "carrying on" the banking business. t45 If
"carrying on" is construed to require a significant level of participation in each
of the functions associated with the banking business, then it is doubtful whether
state thrifts in many states would be found to be carrying on the banking busi-
ness. 14 6 Thrift industry data indicates that in the aggregate thrifts have not
taken advantage of their new bank-like lending powers to a significant extent. 147
Nevertheless, in Deposit Guaranty, the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi state
thrifts "are engaged in the banking business," relying on the Comptroller's deci-
sion, which noted that although the level of thrift institution activity in the
banking business was not quantified in the record, the McFadden Act "does not
... require a showing of a specific level of competitive impact.' 148
According to this reasoning, a state institution is "carrying on" the banking
business if it has the legal authority to offer those products and services tradi-
tionally associated with the banking business. Thus, if a national bank may per-
form its basic banking functions as a state thrift pursuant to state law, there is no
143. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
145. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(h) (1982).
146. See Griffin, supra note 106, at 263 ("an institution should not be considered a 'state bank'
unless it engages in each essential activity of the 'banking business' in a substantial way").
147. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
148. Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d at 271; Decision of the Comptroller on Deposit Guaranty,
supra note 123, at E-10.30-.31; see Texas v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp. 573, 577 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (endors-
ing the Comptroller's finding that Texas thrifts may " 'provide the same basic products and services
that are provided by commercial banks' "); Letter from Ballard C. Gilmore, Director for Corporate
Activity, Bank Organization and Structure, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Richard R.
Cheatham, Kilpatrick & Cody (Mar. 31, 1987), reprinted in 2 H. PIr, D. MILES & A. AIN, supra
note 22, app. at E-13.1 (1988) (denying the branching application of a Georgia national bank because
the application fails to demonstrate that "state-chartered thrifts in Georgia are indeed 'carrying on
the banking business' ").
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legal restriction to keep a national bank from converting its charter to that of a
state thrift and conducting its banking business pursuant to state law allowing
state thrifts to perform such functions. 149 Pursuant to the McFadden Act, the
national bank should be allowed, without conversion to a thrift charter, to
branch to the same extent as such a state thrift. This interpretation preserves
competitive equality between national banks and state institutions carrying on
the banking business. Thus, state thrifts should be found to be "carrying on" the
banking business if they have been granted the statutory authority to engage in
those functions most closely associated with commercial banking, for it is the
statutory authority allowing them to carry on the banking business that presents
the competitive equality issue.
In summary, branching limitations applicable to banks are a matter for
state decision. The McFadden Act specifically ties the ability of a national bank
to establish a branch to the availability of state bank branching. To ensure,
however, that state branching restrictions do not discriminate against national
banks, the Act authorizes a national bank to branch to the same extent as any
state-chartered institution carrying on the banking business under the authority
of state laws. In a state that has chosen to allow thrift institutions to engage in
the functions traditionally associated with commercial banking and that has
granted state thrifts broader branching privileges than state banks, it is consis-
tent with the McFadden Act to allow a national bank to branch to the same
extent as a state thrift. 150 This is true even though state thrifts may not be
currently exercising some of their bank-like powers to a significant extent. If a
state complains of the potential unfairness to its state-chartered commercial
banks, the remedy is obvious: the state may rationalize its laws to remove the
disparity by either expanding the branching privileges of state-chartered banks
or eliminating the banking powers authorized for state-chartered thrifts.
B. Commercial Bank Market Expansion by Merger With An Existing
Commercial Bank
The second method by which a bank may expand its market is by merging
with, acquiring, or otherwise combining with another bank (hereafter referred to
as a merger regardless of the form of the transaction).151 The proposed merger
149. There are numerous practical limitations that might discourage a national bank from con-
verting to a state thrift charter. These include the asset percentage limitations that may limit an
institution's loan authority and the higher deposit insurance costs for thrifts to obtain deposit insur-
ance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation than for banks to obtain deposit
insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
150. It may be argued that Deposit Guaranty and the other similar decisions have not been moti-
vated by concern for the possible prejudice to national banks from the fact that state thrifts may
branch statewide, but national banks may not. Rather, the courts may have employed the broad
definition of "state bank" in the McFadden Act to effectively remove more restrictive state commer-
cial bank branching statutes feeling that restrictive branching schemes deserve little court protection.
Traditional justifications for restricting branch banking, to protect local interests from outside com-
petition and to retain local control over local deposits, are hard to defend. See Butler & Macey,
supra note 94, at 702-03 (state branching restrictions and the McFadden Act limit competition).
151. As discussed in Part II A, the location of the branch offices of the resulting entity must
comply with state branching proscriptions if the resulting entity is a state-chartered bank, or with
the McFadden Act's branching restrictions if the resulting entity is a national bank.
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first must be approved by the appropriate federal banking agency. The Bank
Merger Act sets forth the procedure for review of a proposed bank merger. 152 It
delegates to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) review of a
merger resulting in a national bank, to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) review
of a merger resulting in a state bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve
System, and to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) review of a
merger resulting in a state bank insured by the FDIC, but not a Federal Reserve
System member.153 The reviewing agency considers various factors under the
Bank Merger Act,1 54 including the effect of the proposed merger on competition
in the relevant market. 155 A bank holding company may also expand its opera-
tions by acquiring the stock of an additional bank.' 56 Pursuant to the Bank
Holding Company Act, the FRB must approve such an acquisition.' 57 If the
bank to be acquired operates in the same markets as any existing bank subsidiar-
ies, the FRB must also consider the antitrust consequences of the acquisition.' 5 8
In recent years the practice of the federal banking agencies and the Depart-
ment of Justice in reviewing the antitrust consequences of these mergers and
acquisitions has been to include thrift institutions in the product market when
evaluating the effect of a proposed bank merger on competition.159 Their justifi-
cation is that enhancement of thrift institution powers in the early 1980s now
enables thrifts to offer products and services previously associated exclusively
with commercial banks. Thus, the federal banking agencies consider thrift insti-
tutions as bank competitors, disregarding contrary Supreme Court precedent
predating the enhancement of thrift powers. In 1963 the Court defined the
product market in a commercial bank merger as the unique cluster of products
and services associated with commercial banking.' 60 In 1974 the Supreme
Court confined the product market to commercial banks, specifically excluding
savings banks because they were not yet "significant participants" in the provi-
sion of commercial banking products and services.' 6 1
This section sets forth the antitrust review procedures for a bank merger,
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982) (applicable to the merger of two banks and to an asset purchase
and liability assumption by one bank of another); see also Change in Bank Control Act, id. § 18170)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (similar procedures set forth for review of an application by an individual to
acquire a bank); Bank Holding Company Act, id. § 1842(c) (1982) (similar procedures set forth for
FRB review of a proposed stock or asset acquisition of a bank by a bank holding company). When a
merger involves a state-chartered institution, state law requirements may be applicable. See M.
MALLOY, supra note 5, at § 9.4 (1988). See generally Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitor-
ing, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1212-23 (1988) (setting forth the
legal and regulatory constraints relating to bank mergers).
153. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(A),(B) & (C) (1982).
154. The other factors to be considered by the reviewing agency are "the financial and manage-
rial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and
needs of the community to be served." 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1982).
155. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1982); see infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1842(c).
159. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
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examines the development of the Supreme Court's product market definition,
critically evaluates its continuing validity, and considers how product market
definition should reflect the participation of thrifts in traditional commercial
bank products and services.
1. Bank Merger Antitrust Review Procedures
The federal banking agency must determine whether the effect of the pro-
posed bank merger "may be substantially to lessen competition"'162 -language
adopted from section 7 of the Clayton Act that has been interpreted to import
the Clayton Act analysis into the evaluation of bank mergers.1 63 The Depart-
ment of Justice also reviews the antitrust consequences of the proposed combina-
tion and may challenge the agency's approval of the merger pursuant to section
7.164 The two levels of antitrust review are unique to bank mergers;1 65 other
mergers are reviewed only by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission pursuant to the Clayton Act and the other antitrust laws.
166
Although there are "no definite quantitative or qualitative tests.., to deter-
mine whether [a merger] may 'substantially' lessen competition," 167 market
share figures and other relevant factors such as barriers to entry by new competi-
tors help to gauge a merger's probable effect on competition. 168 Thus, the appli-
cable federal banking agency and the Department of Justice consider the market
shares of the parties to the merger and the market shares of other participants in
the same market. 169 Market share figures reflect the extent to which the market
is concentrated and the extent to which consummation of the proposed merger
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1982). An agency may approve an anticompetitive merger if"it
finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served." Id.
A bank merger may also be disapproved based on antitrust considerations in addition to a
lessening of competition if it would (1) "result in a monopoly"; (2) "be in furtherance of any combi-
nation or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking"; (3) "tend
to create a monopoly"; or (4) "in any other manner would be in restraint of trade." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(5)(A) (1982). The Bank Holding Company Act, id. § 1842(c), and the Change in Bank
Control Act, id. § 1817(j)(7)(A) & (B), contain similar standards.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 663
(1974).
164. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6), (c)(7) (1982). In most cases, the Department of Justice has only 30
calendar days after the agency approval in which to challenge an acquisition approved by the federal
banking agency. Id. In the case of certain emergency acquisitions, the period in which the Depart-
ment may challenge the approval is shorter. Id. § 1828(c)(6). In addition, prior to approving a
merger, the responsible agency in the "interests of uniform standards" shall request a report on the
competitive factors involved in the merger from the Attorney General and the other two banking
agencies. Id. § 1828(c)(4).
165. Note, Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case for Procedural and Substantive Deregulation,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1915 (1982) ("The agency approval process ... constitutes a barrier that
merging non-bank financial institutions do not face.").
166. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (Clayton Act). The Department of Justice may also challenge a
merger based on an alleged violation of § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982)
(making illegal combinations in restraint of trade, monopolies, attempts to monopolize, or conspira-
cies to monopolize any part of trade or commerce).
167. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962).
168. Id. at 322 & n.38.
169. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824
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will increase market concentration. 170 The more concentrated a market is, the
more likely it is that one participant or a small group of participants could suc-
cessfully exercise market power.1 71
Definition of the appropriate market in which to measure the merger's po-
tential foreclosure of competition is "complex because of the requirement that it
be analyzed in two dimensions: the product market or 'line of commerce' and
the geographic market."17 2 The relevant geographic market is "where, within
the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be
direct and immediate." 173 The relevant product market is generally thought of
as including all products "reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes." 174
In 1984 the Department of Justice issued revised merger guidelines applica-
ble to mergers between all types of businesses.' 75 These guidelines endorse the
use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of market concen-
tration. 176 The federal banking agencies also use the HHI in measuring market
concentration. 177 The HHI figures measure the presence of all firms in the mar-
ket and give proportionately greater weight to those firms with large market
(1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4490, 4493 (1984) [hereinafter DOJ MERGER
GUIDELINES].
170. Id.; E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 1, at 514.
171. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 3.1. A significant increase in market
concentration is "so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially" that unless there is clear
evidence that the merger will not have such anticompetitive effects, it must be enjoined. United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
172. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 1, at 513.
173. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357; accord United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974) (The relevant geographic market is "the area in which the goods or
services at issue are marketed to a significant degree by the acquired firm."). The geographic market
is usually rather small; "[c]ommercial realities in the banking industry make clear that banks gener-
ally have a very localized business." United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 362
(1970).
174. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
175. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169. These guidelines replaced guidelines issued in
1982. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1113,102 (1988).
176. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 3.1; see generally Calkins, The New
Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402 (1983) (evaluating
the advantages and consequences of the change to the HHI). The HHI replaces the four-firm con-
centration ratio as a measure of market concentration. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169,
at 3.1. The four-firm concentration ratio was calculated by summing the market shares of the four
largest firms in the relevant market. A highly concentrated market was one with a four-firm concen-
tration ratio of 75% or higher. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDE-
LINES, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101, at 5 (1988). A merger in such a market
would ordinarily be challenged if firms with the following market shares were involved:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
45o 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
In less concentrated markets, different levels applied to determine if a proposed merger was
likely to be challenged. Id.
177. See, e.g., FDIC Notice Requesting Comments on Revised Proposed Policy Statement on
Bank Merger Transactions, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,803 (1988) [hereinafter FDIC Revised Proposed Policy
Statement] (a merger will normally be approved unless the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800 points
and the merger would increase the HHI by 200 or more points).
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shares.178 To calculate the HHI figures, the market share of each firm in the
market is determined.1 79 Traditionally, the market shares of banks have been
approximated by the percentage of deposits held by each bank in the relevant
geographic market. The individual market share percentages are squared and
then summed.180 The resulting number is the HHI for the premerger market.' 8
The same calculation is then performed assuming that the proposed merger has
taken place to determine the postmerger HHI. 82
The Department of Justice's merger guidelines state that it is likely to chal-
lenge a merger as anticompetitive if the merger would increase the HHI by over
50 points and would result in a postmerger HHL of over 1800 points.'8 3 The
Department has indicated, however, that it will challenge a bank merger with a
postmerger HHI of over 1800 points only if the merger would increase the HHI
by over 200 points.18 4 The Department has explained that it uses higher-than-
178. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 3.1 (giving greater weight to the larger
firms in the market "probably accords with their relative importance in any collusive interaction").
179. Id. at 3.1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 13.11. The following example illustrates the HHI market concentration calculations:
Pre-Merger
Market Market Shares Market Share










Upon the merger of C and E, the market share structure would be as follows:
Pre-Merger
Market Market Shares Market Share
Participants (As % of Total Deposits) Squared
A 30% 900








In this example, the postmerger HHI is 2350 and the increase in the HHI as a result of the
merger is 400. This merger is one that the Department of Justice would be likely to challenge. See
infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
183. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 3.11. If the postmerger HHI substantially
exceeds 1800 and the increase in the HHI as a result of the merger exceeds 100, the Justice Depart-
ment has stated that "only in extraordinary cases" will other factors establish that the merger is not
likely to lessen competition substantially. Id.
184. McQuinn & Strom, What is Behind Justice's Laxity in Regulation of Bank Mergers?, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, 28, 29 (citing letter dated Feb. 8, 1985, from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant
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normal HHI thresholds for bank mergers to take account of "the competitive
effect of limited-purpose lenders and other non-depository financial entities"
that are not otherwise specifically considered in the HHI calculation.' 85
2. The Supreme Court's Product Market Definition for Bank Mergers
In 1963, on its first occasion to define the product market or line of com-
merce in the case of a merger of two commercial banks, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 186 found a single,
broad product market consisting of "the cluster of products (various kinds of
credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust administration) de-
noted by the term 'commercial banking.'" The Court set forth several reasons
for defining a single product market. First, the court observed that some com-
mercial bank products and services, such as checking accounts and short-term
commercial credit, were then offered only by commercial banks.18 7 For some
products provided by other financial institutions, such as consumer loans offered
by consumer finance companies, commercial banks had a significant competitive
advantage because noninterest-bearing checking accounts provided their source
of funds.' 88 Finally, although some commercial bank products and services
could be offered by other financial institutions without cost disadvantages, such
as savings accounts offered by thrift institutions, many of the products provided
by commercial banks enjoyed a settled customer preference over the alternative
products, further insulating commercial banks from effective competition from
any financial institutions other than commercial banks.' 8 9
In 1970 the definition of the product market in a commercial bank merger
was before the Supreme Court again in United States v. Phillipsburg National
Bank & Trust Co..' 90 The proposed merger was between two small commercial
Attorney General, to C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, and letter dated Aug. 7, 1985,
from Mr. Rule to Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors);
see infra notes 227-64 and accompanying text.
185. See Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 62, 64 n.ll (1988).
186. 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). The district court rejected the government's proposed multiple
product lines. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 361-62 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The line of commerce definition was not contested on appeal, but never-
theless the Supreme Court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to the proper definition of the
line of commerce. 374 U.S. at 335; see Rosenblum, O'Brien & DiClemente, On Banks, Nonbanks,
and Overlapping Markets: A Reassessment of Commercial Banking as a Line of Commerce, 51
TENN. L. REV. 401, 409 (1984); accord United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust, 399 U.S.
350, 360 (1970) ("Commercial banks are the only financial institutions in which a wide variety of
financial products and services-some unique to commercial banking and others not-are gathered
together in one place. The clustering of financial products and services in banks facilitates conve-
nient access to them for all banking customers."). As one commentator noted, it is
the aggregate of a commercial bank's products and services [that] set it discernibly apart
from other financial institutions.... [N]owhere else could a consumer of banking products
find those products so conveniently gathered under one roof. The whole, in a real sense,
was something qualitatively different from the sum of its individual parts.
May, Redefining the Product Market: Commercial Bank Mergers in the New Competitive Era, 103
BANKING L.J. 124, 130 (1986).
187. Philadelphia Nat' Bank, 374 U.S. at 356 & n.33.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 357.
190. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
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banks whose activities more closely resembled those of thrift institutions than
those of large commercial banks. The Comptroller of the Currency approved
the merger based on a product market definition that included finance compa-
nies and savings and loan associations. 19 1 Although the Supreme Court recog-
nized the thrift-like character of the two banks proposing to merge, it rejected
the inclusion of finance companies and savings and loan associations in the prod-
uct market, stating that "the cluster of products and services termed commercial
banking has economic significance well beyond the various products and services
involved." 192 One commentator interpreted the Court's product market holding
as suggesting that "a commercial bank's authority to provide a relatively broad
cluster of powers, rather than the degree to which it exercised that authority,
distinguished it from thrifts and other financial institutions."' 193
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the product market definition
in a commercial bank merger is its 1974 decision in United States v. Connecticut
National Bank. 194 The Comptroller approved a merger of two commercial
banks located in Connecticut based on a product market definition that included
Connecticut savings banks as well as commercial banks. 195 At the time of the
proposed transaction, Connecticut savings banks were authorized to make con-
sumer and commercial loans as well as real estate mortgage loans.196 In addi-
tion to savings and time deposits, they were soon to receive the authority to
accept demand deposits from consumers, but not business customers.' 9 7
Notwithstanding these bank-like powers, the Supreme Court held that the
Comptroller was "mistaken in including both savings and commercial banks in
the same product market for purposes of this case."' 19 8
The Court acknowledged that "'complete inter-industry competitive over-
lap need not be shown' "before savings banks may be included along with com-
mercial banks in the line of commerce. 199 Nevertheless, it stated that
commercial banks "continue to be able to provide a cluster of services that [sav-
ings banks] cannot, particularly with regard to commercial customers." 2° ° Spe-
cifically, the Court noted that savings banks could not provide demand deposit
services to commercial customers, and that, given the level of commercial loans
offered by savings banks in comparison with commercial banks, savings banks
were not meaningful competitors of commercial banks in the commercial loan
market.20 1 The Court concluded its analysis of the product market, noting:
191. Id. at 358-59.
192. Id. at 361.
193. Dunham, supra note 62, at 53 (emphasis added).
194. 418 U.S. 656 (1974) (geographic market extension merger as divestiture of offices in over-
lapping markets eliminated any direct competition).
195. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 280 (D. Conn. 1973), va-
cated and remanded, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
196. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 661.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 662.
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964)).
200. Id. at 664.
201. Id. at 665-66 ("At the end of 1971 commercial banks in Connecticut had outstanding $1.03
billion in commercial loans. Savings banks, by comparison, had $26 million in such loans outstand-
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At some stage in the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic
to distinguish them from commercial banks for purposes of the Clay-
ton Act. In Connecticut, that point may well be reached when and if
savings banks become significant participants in the marketing of bank
services to commercial enterprises. 20 2
3. Product Market Definitions Used by the Federal Banking Agencies and
the Department of Justice
As demonstrated by Connecticut National Bank and Phillipsburg National
Bank, in certain circumstances the OCC was willing to include thrifts as partici-
pants in the product market in evaluating the antitrust consequences of a com-
mercial bank merger. 20 3 Although the Supreme Court rebuffed these efforts, the
federal banking agencies now routinely consider thrift institutions as competi-
tors of commercial banks and include thrift institutions in the product market.
The federal banking agencies have justified the addition of thrifts to the product
market by the statutory enhancement of the powers of thrift institutions in the
early 1980s, a development subsequent to the Supreme Court's 1974 Connecticut
National Bank decision refusing to include savings banks in the product market.
In recent merger decisions the OCC has conducted its analysis of the effect
of the proposed merger on competition by including all "depository institutions"
in the product market.2° 4 The FDIC has also defined the product market
broadly to include thrift institutions.20 5 The FRB has been willing to consider
thrift institutions as competitors of commercial banks, but it normally includes
only fifty percent of thrift institution deposits in the product market.20 6
ing at that time."). "Moreover, commercial banks in the State offer credit-card plans, loans for
securities purchases, trust services, investment services, computer and account services, and letters of
credit. Savings banks do not." Id.
202. Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
203. See supra notes 191 and 195 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application to Merge Bank of
Washington, Bellingham, Wash., into Bellingham National Bank, Bellingham, Wash., Merger No.
88-7 (Mar. 30, 1988) (approval of an application to merge the second and eighth largest depository
institutions in a market that was defined to include sixteen depository institutions, including offices
of the state's two largest thrifts "which represent a major competitive force" within the market);
Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application to Merge the Connecticut National
Bank, Bridgeport, Fairfield County, Conn., into Hartford National Bank and Trust Co., Hartford,
Hartford County, Conn. (Mar. 26, 1982), reprinted in BANKING EXPANSION IN THE '80S 210, 218,
220 (J. Hawke ed. 1982) ("thrifts should be included within the line of commerce used in evaluating
mergers between commercial banks" in the light of the recent expansion of their powers); see also
Bleier & Eisenbeis, Commercial Banking as the "Line of Commerce" and the Role of Thrifts, 98
BANKING L.J. 374, 380-81 (1981); May, supra note 186, at 140.
205. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Proposed Policy Statement on Bank Merger
Transactions, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,599 (1985), reprinted in [1985-1987 Transfer Binder) Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,423; McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29 (discussing In re Savings & Trust
Co. of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Pa., FDIC Order dated April 14, 1987, and In re Summit Bank, Fort
Wayne, Ind., FDIC Order dated March 17, 1987); see FDIC Revised Proposed Policy Statement,
supra note 177 ("[T]he relevant [deposit] shares of savings and loan associations and other deposi-
tory institutions with offices in the relevant geographic market will be considered unless their loan,
deposit or other business varies markedly from that of the merging institutions.").
206. Loeys, Bank Acquisitions: The Mitigating Factors Defense, 103 BANKING L.J. 427, 433, 435
(1986) (The FRB generally includes only 50% of thrift institution deposits in the line of commerce,
reflecting its belief that thrift institutions are not yet "active competitors of commercial banks."). A
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The Department of Justice, however, has abandoned the single product
market composed of the cluster of commercial banking products and services in
favor of a separate consumer (or retail) market and a business (or wholesale)
market, each of which is composed of separate banking services that may them-
selves constitute relevant product markets. 20 7 Thrift institutions providing com-
parable services are included in each separate product market. In the consumer
banking market, the Department includes one hundred percent of the deposits of
thrift institutions in its market share calculations.2 0 8 In the business banking
market, however, the Department includes only twenty percent of the deposits
of thrift institutions.20 9
4. Evaluation of the Cluster Product Market Definition Versus Alternative
Product Market Definitions
In Philadelphia National Bank the Supreme Court found a single product
market consisting of the cluster of products and services of commercial bank-
ing.2 10 The Court felt that its approach was warranted by the special economic
niche then occupied by commercial banks. Economic and statutory changes,
however, suggest that commercial banks are no longer the sole occupants of this
special niche. Thus, it is appropriate to reconsider the product market definition
in the light of those changes and the general principle established by the
Supreme Court in United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. that the prod-
study of merger applications decided by the FRB between November 1982 and July 1985 determined
that "[ulntil April 1984, the Fed usually reported how the level and change in the HHI would be
affected if thrift deposits were included at their full value. After April 1984, the Fed usually in-
cluded thrift deposits only at 50 percent of their value, presumably because thrifts were not consid-
ered full competitors of commercial banks." Id. at 435; see, eg., Union State Bancshares, Inc., 74
Fed. Res. Bull. 328 (1988); Valley Bank of Nevada, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 67 (1988); see also Hartford
Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 720, 721 (1987) (considered HHI calculations with 50% and with
100% of thrift deposits included because of the competitive influence exerted by thrifts in the con-
sumer market and their use of their commercial lending powers); Annotation, Denial by Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System of Application for Bank Merger, Consolidation, or Acquisition on
Anticompetitive Grounds under § 3(c) of Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 USCS § 1842(c)),
71 A.L.R. FED. 438, 566-71 (1985).
The FRB may also include thrift institutions in the line of commerce for a commercial bank
merger if the commercial banks involved are active participants in the real estate lending market.
Whereas thrift involvement in traditional commercial bank products is one measure of the
competitive importance of thrifts, the reverse situation-banks competing in traditional
thrift areas-is another. In several cases, mainly involving banks located in Florida, the
Fed cited the similarity in portfolios of banks and thrifts, with banks investing most of their
funds in residential real estate loans, as an important factor in favor of including thrifts in
competitive analysis.
Loeys, supra, at 434; accord Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 204, at 379 ("The weight given to the
presence and role of thrift institutions [by the FRB] has been the greatest in those cases where thrift
institutions are large in absolute size or play a dominant role in providing financial services within
either a specific market or state."); see, ag., NCNB Corp. 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 225, 226 (1984) (com-
mercial bank portfolios and thrift portfolios were similar in that 52% of the commercial bank loans
were real estate loans, while only 15% of commercial bank loans were commercial loans).
207. McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29; see infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
208. McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29 (citing letters from the Department of Justice to
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Gover-
nors); see infra note 254 and accompanying text.
209. McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29; see infra note 262 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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uct market should consist of all products "reasonably interchangeable by con-
sumers for the same purposes. '2 11
The three reasons the Supreme Court gave in Philadelphia National Bank
to justify its decision to define a single product market in a commercial bank
merger may no longer be valid.2 12 First, the Court stated that "[s]ome commer-
cial banking products or services are so distinctive that they are entirely free of
effective competition from products or services of other financial institu-
tions."'21 3 The Court cited checking accounts and short-term commercial credit
as examples of distinctive products offered exclusively by commercial banks.21 4
The Court was of the view that these bank products had no available substitutes.
Today, few, if any, services are offered by commercial banks that are not also
offered either by thrifts, non-depository financial institutions, or both. Thrifts,
of course, may now offer checking accounts to their commercial loan customers,
NOW accounts to their consumer customers, and short-term commercial
credit.215
The second justification for the cluster of products and services definition
given in Philadelphia National Bank was that some products and services "enjoy
such cost advantages as to be insulated [from competition] within a broad range
from substitutes furnished by other institutions. '21 6  As an example, the
Supreme Court noted that commercial banks have a significant cost advantage
in pricing consumer loans vis-A-vis small loan companies that also provide such
loans.2 1 7 One important reason for this cost advantage, according to the Court,
was that commercial banks obtain the bulk of their working capital from check-
ing accounts for which they do not have to pay interest.21 8 This cost advantage,
however, is diminishing; since the authorization in 1980 of NOW accounts for
the consumer customers of commercial banks, an increasing percentage of com-
211. 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 273-77
(1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (separate product markets (sub.
markets) would be identified by "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
economic entity [and] the product's peculiar characteristics and uses"); Cairns, Retail and Wholesale
Banking: Diverging Markets and Lines of Commerce, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 713, 736-37 (1981)
(applying Brown Shoe to recognize retail banking and wholesale banking as separate submarkets);
May, supra note 186, at 147-48 (suggesting that the Brown Shoe analysis may be applied to find
various submarkets for commercial banks such as transaction accounts, time deposits, commercial
loans, consumer loans, and trust services, but concluding that a submarket analysis is undesirable);
Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96
HARV. L. REV. 907, 917-18 (1983) ("The basic principles of product market definition rest on the
concept of substitutability.").
212. Vartanian, Potential Competition and Bank Mergers: Defense Blueprint for the 1980s, 99
BANKING L.J. 882, 901 (1982).
213. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
214. Id.
215. May, supra note 186, at 145 ("As a result of these recent [legislative] enactments, it is no
longer possible to say, as the Supreme Court did in 1963, that the checking account is a commercial
banking product 'entirely free of effective competition.' ").
216. Philadelphia Nat' Bank, 374 U.S. at 356.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 357 n.33. An additional reason given by the Court for the cost of funds advantage for
commercial banks is that the loan "companies' working capital consists in substantial part of bank
loans." Id. at 356.
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mercial bank checking accounts are interest-bearing. 2 19 In addition, commer-
cial customers now undertake sophisticated cash management techniques to
avoid leaving large balances in noninterest-bearing checking accounts. 220 These
commercial bank products, therefore, are no longer insulated by cost advantages
from competition with substitute products provided by other financial
institutions.
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the cluster of products and services
offered by commercial banks "enjoy[ed] a settled consumer preference insulating
them, to a marked degree, from competition."'22 1 This settled consumer prefer-
ence for commercial banks was used to explain why customers kept money on
deposit in savings accounts at commercial banks when in many markets they
could earn a one-half percent higher interest rate in savings accounts at nearby
thrift institutions. Again, it is arguable whether this customer preference for
products and services provided by commercial banks still exists. Consumer and
business depositors have become more interest-rate sensitive, particularly during
inflationary times.222 In the late 1970s and early 1980s depositors withdrew
funds from commercial bank and thrift accounts to invest in money market mu-
tual funds not constrained by the deposit interest rate ceilings that still applied
to commercial banks and thrifts.22 3 Moreover, many customers no longer seek
all of their bank services from the same institution but may have checking and
savings accounts at one institution and loans (consumer, home mortgage, or
commercial) at other institutions.224 In addition, for customers still seeking the
convenience of "one-stop" financial shopping, thrift institutions may also pro-
vide all financial services previously only available from a commercial bank.225
If there is no longer a customer preference for products provided by commercial
219. See Simpson, supra note 30, at 8 ("The added premium [on deposits] that many banks now
pay has put upward pressure on bank costs, and therefore more high-grade corporate borrowers
have gone directly to the open market for credit.").
220. For instance, some commercial customers have "sweep accounts" that sweep checking ac-
count balances at the end of each day to overnight investments and some have "controlled disburse-
ment accounts" that clear debits early in the day, allowing greater short-term investment flexibility.
See Mahoney, The Recent Behavior of Demand Deposits, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 195, 201 (1988).
221. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357.
222. May, supra note 186, at 126 ("economic conditions have increased the competition that
banks face from the unregulated financial institutions").
223. Cummings, Commercial Banking as a Line of Commerce: Time for Change?, ECON. REV.
(Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas), Sept. 1982, at 11, 13-14 (money market mutual funds have attracted
interest sensitive bank customers); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
224. Sunwest Financial Services, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 463, 469 (1987) (separate statement by
Governors Johnson and Heller) ("Improved technology, communications, and marketing [have]
broadened significantly the alternatives available to customers for both credit and deposit services,"
so that "consumers are no longer confined to their neighborhood bank as the sole source of banking
services."); Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 204, at 384 (In today's economic environment "both con-
sumers and business[es] have become increasingly more sophisticated in unbundling their banking
relationships, seeking the highest returns on invested funds while obtaining loans at the lowest possi-
ble cost."); Cairns, supra note 211, at 739 (discussing "changes in the buying practices of commer-
cial banks' customers, who have begun to shop comparatively for individual banking services").
225. See S. REP. No. 368, supra note 47, at 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 248 (The Monetary Control Act of 1980 "should enable thrifts to become one-stop family
financial centers.").
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banks over similar products provided by other institutions, the competing prod-
ucts should be included in the product market.
If the cluster approach to product market definition no longer reflects mar-
ket conditions, it should be abandoned in favor of separate product markets,
each of which include all reasonably interchangeable products. 226 For instance,
it may be argued that because consumer loans are not reasonably interchangea-
ble with or reasonable substitutes for commercial loans, each constitutes a sepa-
rate product market.
The Justice Department has attempted to identify separate product markets
of economically distinct products. Its letter to the Federal Reserve Board re-
garding the anticompetitive effects of a proposed acquisition by Comerica Incor-
porated, the second largest bank holding company in Michigan, of the third
largest bank holding company in Michigan is referred to here as an illustration
of this approach. 227 The Department identified two major categories of services
in which both bank holding companies competed-consumer banking services
and business banking services.2 28 Within each broad service category the De-
partment specified separate products that might constitute individual product
markets. 229 Consumer banking services included transaction accounts, time ac-
counts, savings accounts, consumer loans, and residential mortgage loans.23 0
Business banking services included demand deposit accounts and commercial
loans.2 3
1
Identification of separate product markets also requires identification of
separate geographic markets for each product market. 232 For example, a prod-
226. Cairns, supra note 211, at 734 (proposing a division of the cluster into wholesale and retail
banking); Cummings, supra note 223, at 16-17 (advocating disaggregating cluster by customer
groups rather than product type); Rosenblum, O'Brien & DiClemente, supra note 186, at 442 (pro-
posing an examination of a merger's effect on competition on a product-by-product basis); Var-
tanian, supra note 212, at 908-09 (advocating the use of two clusters of services for consumer
financial services and wholesale financial services); Note, Bank Mergers: Agency Review and the
Changing Line of Commerce, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 323 (1982) ("The Supreme Court's defini-
tion of the line of commerce, though arguably apropos when first announced . . . , has become
anachronistic due to changes in the financial marketplace."); Note, supra note 211, at 912-16; Note,
Banking Mergers and "Line of Commerce"After the Monetary Control Act: A Submarket Approach,
1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 731; see Gilbert & Murphy, Competition Between Thrift Institutions and Com-
mercial Banks, An Examination of the Evidence, J. BANK Ras., Summer 1971, 8, 18 ("increased
competition among commercial banks and thrift institutions for savings-type liabilities in the 1960's
suggests that some reconsideration of the commercial bank product line specification may be in
order"); Hale, Comment on Dr. Austin's Article: The Evolution of the Commercial Bank Merger
Antitrust Law, 39 Bus. LAW. 1557, 1564 (1981); Lovatti, The Growing Similarity Among Financial
Institutions, 59 FED. REs. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 8, 11 (1977).
227. Letter to Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, from
Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice
(Aug. 7, 1985) (concerning application filed by Comerica Incorporated and sent to the FRB pursu-
ant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1982)) [hereinafter DOJ Comerica Letter]. This letter is discussed
and cited in McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29. A copy of the letter may be obtained from the
Justice Department through a Freedom of Information Act request.




232. Note, supra note 211, at 922-23 ("After the crucial product lines are established, the geo-
graphic market for each line should be determined.").
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uct market composed of large commercial loans could well be nationwide in
geographic area, while the consumer loan product market might well be limited
to the local area.233 Because a proposed merger will be disapproved if it fore-
closes competition in any relevant market, an analysis of the separate product
markets involved in a commercial bank merger may be simplified by concentrat-
ing exclusively on those product markets likely to be associated with small geo-
graphic markets in which a merger would most likely have the effect of lessening
competition. 234 Thus, in the Comerica letter the Justice Department evaluated
competition for consumer banking services provided in the local geographic
market and confined its evaluation of competition for business banking services
to the small business loan market-the product market in which competition for
business services was most likely to be adversely affected. 235
After defining the relevant product and geographic markets, the partici-
pants in each of those markets must be identified. In the Comerica letter the
Justice Department considered only banks and thrift institutions as participants
in the market for consumer banking services. In a letter to the Comptroller of
the Currency relating to competitive factors in another proposed bank merger,
the Department recognized the competitive significance in that geographic mar-
ket of certain nondepository financial institutions such as consumer finance com-
panies. 236 The Department relied on market share calculations based on deposit
shares of only thrifts and banks, however, because the Department's threshold
HHI levels for bank mergers have been set higher than for mergers of other
businesses to "implicitly recognize the competitive effect of such limited-purpose
lenders and other non-depository financial entities."'2 37
In the Comerica review the Department considered local commercial
banks, local thrift institutions, commercial credit companies, and out-of-market
banks with local loan production offices or officer call programs, as possible par-
233. Cairns, supra note 211, at 743 ("a national market often will be appropriate for analysis of
the effect on competition of a merger of wholesale banks").
234. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (substantial elimination of com-
petition in any identifiable economically significant submarket is a violation of the Clayton Act); see
Cairns, supra note 211, at 715 (it is sufficient for enjoining a merger on antitrust grounds to find a
single product market of reasonable importance in which competition is substantially lessened);
May, supra note 186, at 148-49 ("Submarket analysis might also have the effect of making it difficult
to approve even meritorious bank mergers, for the variety of financial products is so great that
almost certainly some submarket could be defined in which competition would be lessened by the
merger of two banks.").
235. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 6-7. The Department concluded that business
banking services provided to medium and large size corporations were competitive because of the
substantial number of credit sources available to these customers in the larger regional and national
markets. Id. at 7. Thus, the Department focused only on small business customers with annual sales
of less than $5 to $10 million as the business customer group most likely to be affected by the
proposed acquisition. Id. These businesses, the Department stated, were limited to local depository
institutions for unsecured credit and checking accounts. Id. at 8 n.19.
236. Letter to C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, from Charles F. Rule, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice (Feb. 8, 1985) (regarding the
application of First National Bank of Jackson), cited in McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29.
This letter is available from the Department of Justice pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act
request.
237. Id. at 5 n. 10.
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ticipants in the small business loan market. 238 All these institutions could le-
gally offer small business loans, but not all were currently exercising this power.
The Department recognized, however, that although the product market focuses
"primarily on firms that currently produce and sell the relevant product,' 239
"firms that do not currently sell the relevant product, but that could easily and
economically sell it using existing facilities, are included in the market and are
assigned a market share.' 24° The Justice Department's merger guidelines sug-
gest including an institution in the product market if it could sell the relevant
product within one year in response to a "'small but significant and nontran-
sitory' increase in price."' 24 1 Including potential market participants recognizes
the competitive effect exerted by these institutions with the legal authority to
offer particular commercial bank products and services on commercial banks.
These institutions may be perceived by commercial banks in the market as po-
tential competitors waiting in the wings.242 If commercial banks in a concen-
trated market attempt to exercise their market power by charging
supracompetitive prices on commercial loans, for instance, thrifts or commercial
credit companies may find it profitable to enter this line of business in a signifi-
cant manner. 243 The specter of potential entry will currently serve to limit the
238. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 8.
239. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 2.2.
240. DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 3.3.
241. DOJ MERGER MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at t 2.21. The Department has cau-
tioned that a firm that "would have significant difficulty distributing or marketing the new product
or for some other reason would find the substitution unprofitable ... will not be included in the
market." Id.; see also Dunham & Guerin-Calvert, supra note 62, at 54 ("the estimated volume of
commercial loans a thrift would make in response to a hypothetical increase in local market prices"
would be a good measure of thrift competition for commercial loans).
242. The Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of perceived potential competition in deter-
mining whether a proposed acquisition of a market participant by a perceived potential market par-
ticipant will act to substantially lessen competition in the market. United States v. Marine Bancorp,
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 639-40 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-32
(1973) ("Suspect also is the acquisition by a company not competing in the market but so situated as
to be a potential competitor and likely to exercise substantial influence on market behavior.");
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964) ("The existence of an aggressive,
well equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce wait-
ing anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition which
cannot be underestimated.").
A question of paramount importance in any discussion of the competitive consequences of
a merger is whether potential competitors face significant barriers to entry. Unfortunately,
this question cannot be answered under the cluster rule. That is, the effect of potential
competition in restraining the exercise of market power of firms cannot be assessed.
Rosenblum, O'Brien & DiClemente, supra note 186, at 443.
243. [I]f local thrift institutions are perceived as potentially capable of making commercial
loans at competitive prices, commercial banks may respond by lowering their commercial
loan prices and limiting profitability. Their action may effectively discourage the thrifts
from actually making any commercial loans. Nevertheless, the thrifts' competitive influ-
ence in commercial lending in this local banking market is undeniable.
Dunham & Guerin-Calvert, supra note 62, at 52; see also Hannan, Competition Between Commercial
Banks and Thrift Institutions. An Empirical Examination, 15 J. BANK RESEARCH 8, 9 (1984) (con-
cluding, contrary to most previous studies, that thrifts "substantially influence certain aspects of the
behavior of commercial banks, thus casting doubt on the 'unique line of commerce' doctrine, even as
it applied on the pre-1980 environment"). But see Cox & Parker, Do Banks Price as if Thrifts Mat-
ter?, ECON. REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta) 49, 51 (April 1982) (finding no empirical support for
the proposition that banks price retail services as if thrifts matter).
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pricing decisions of the commercial bank market participants.
In the Comercia letter the Department did not include commercial credit
companies or out-of-market banks in the product market, however, because they
were not important providers of credit to small businesses in the market and
because no evidence indicated that these institutions would shift resources to
this market in the event of a significant nontransitory increase in small business
loan prices by commercial banks. 24 4 The Department concluded that local
thrift institutions had the potential to provide small business loans, although
they had not yet utilized fully their commercial loan powers, and should be
included in the market.2
4 5
Calculating market share in separate product markets identified for each
economically distinct bank product and service is difficult.246 The traditional
measure of a bank's market share is the bank's share of the total bank deposits in
the market.247 This measure is easy to calculate because bank deposit data is
readily available. The approach has a number of defects, however. The ap-
proach is not a good measure of participation in a product market defined for a
distinct product or service, rather than a product market composed of the clus-
ter of products and services, because there may be no stable relationship between
the amount of the product offered and the amount of the institution's depos-
its.24 8 Deposit shares also obviously account only for competition provided by
depository institutions. 249 The competition that may be provided by finance
companies, mortgage loan companies, and other nondepository financial institu-
tions in particular product markets is not measured. Nor do deposit shares ac-
count for competition that may be provided by depository institutions with
deposits located outside the relevant geographic market.
250
Obviously, a better measure of market share would be based on the dollar
amount of the particular product provided by each institution in the market.
2 51
244. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 8-9. In addition, the Justice Department noted
that restrictive branching and interstate banking provisions made it unlikely that out-of-market insti-
tutions would enter in the near future to provide banking services to small business customers. Id. at
13.
245. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11. Factors limiting the commercial lending of
thrifts were the asset percentage limitations on commercial lending, the start-up costs associated
with commercial lending, the traditional emphasis of thrifts on real estate lending, and the tax and
other incentives for thrifts to remain concentrated in real estate lending. Id. at 9.
246. McQuinn & Strom, supra note 184, at 29 ("bank records typically do not distinguish be-
tween small-business loans ... and other commercial loans," and thus a submarket approach may
"not [be] readily susceptible to proof in a court of law"); Vartanian, supra note 212, at 909 ("the lack
of available industry and regulatory data to support such changes in product market analysis is the
greater stumbling block to establishing distinguishable congeries of financial services that cut across
traditional and institutional lines of demarcation"); see May, supra note 186, at 148 (the use of
submarkets "would be an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure for courts to apply, requiring a
detailed analysis of what could be stretched into an almost endless procession of submarkets").
247. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text; see also DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 169, at 2.4.
248. Vartanian, supra note 212, at 910 ("Deposits say nothing about a bank's share of the loan
market . . ").
249. Vartanian, supra note 212, at 910-11.
250. Vartanian, supra note 212, at 911.
251. See DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 2.4 (market shares may be expressed
in dollar terms through measurement of sales); Note, supra note 211, at 923 ("to determine the
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Because of practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary data, however, the
Department of Justice has relied in some instances on deposit share data to pro-
vide an approximate measure of market share. For instance, in its Comerica
letter the Department included commercial banks along with thrift institutions
in a broadly defined consumer banking product market and calculated market
concentration based on the deposit shares of these institutions.2 52 The Depart-
ment acknowledged that disaggregated product data for each separate consumer
banking service would provide a more accurate measure of market share than
total deposit data for the broader product market.253 Nevertheless, the Depart-
ment calculated market concentration in the consumer banking market based on
the total deposit shares of banks and thrifts because deposit data is more readily
available than data regarding the volume of specific banking services and "in
many cases provides a reasonable proxy for the likely competitive effects of bank
mergers."'254
The Department encountered even more difficulty in calculating market
concentration in the market for small business loans. It considered two possible
methods for measuring the participation of banks and thrifts in the small busi-
ness loan product market. One measure of market participation was the actual
volume of small business loans and the second measure was based on the
weighted total deposits of the banks and thrifts in the market.255 Call report
data for all commercial loans made by banks and thrifts was available, but it
included loans to nonlocal businesses and to larger corporations. 2 56 Therefore,
the Department relied on survey data submitted by the parties concerning the
volume of "middle-market" commercial lending by local banks.257 Although
this data included loans to larger corporations that were not limited to local
credit providers, the Department found this data more useful than the even
more general call report data. 258 To this data on commercial bank lending the
Department added its own estimate of the current volume of thrift lending to
small businesses and then tripled this estimate to account for the likely increase
in small business lending by thrifts in the next several years, thus accounting for
the effect the potential competition of thrifts likely exerted on pricing decisions
by commercial banks in the small business loan market. 25 9 Under these assump-
tions, the Department found the acquisition would be significantly adverse to
market share of a commercial bank in the local business, short-term loan market, a court would
simply divide the dollar amount of that bank's outstanding short-term loans to local businesses by
the total amount of outstanding short-term loans to local businesses, from banks and nonbanks, in
the geographic market").
252. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 7.
253. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 7 n.16.
254. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 7 n.16 (indicating that the limited data available
concerning discrete products was consistent with its analysis based on deposit share data).
255. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 10.
256. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11.
257. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11.
258. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11 n.25 ("With more time, more accurate market
share data could be developed.").
259. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11.
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competition. 260
An alternative measure of market share for small business loans was then
calculated based on an institution's weighted total deposits as a proxy for its
small business loan market share.261 The Department considered one hundred
percent of each bank's deposits, but concluded that only a twenty percent weight
should be assigned to thrift deposits based on their current and likely future
participation in small business lending.262 Under this measure of market con-
centration, the acquisition also was found to have a significantly adverse effect
on competition for small business loans. 263 The Department concluded that di-
vestiture of some small business loans in the market would be necessary to miti-
gate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition while preserving its benefits. 264
The Department's experience indicates that the identification of separate
product markets and properly accounting for the participation of all providers of
those products is at best difficult and imprecise. Indeed, perhaps because of the
practical difficulties in the evaluation of competition in separate product mar-
kets, the FDIC, OCC, and FRB have continued to follow the cluster ap-
proach. 265 Lower courts also have rejected the Justice Department's attempts to
define separate product markets, apparently feeling bound by the contrary
Supreme Court precedent.2 66 Needless to say, the cluster product market defini-
tion does have certain benefits. It is easy to administer, data is readily available,
and the merging banks can easily forecast the likelihood that the merger will be
found anticompetitive.
If the cluster approach to product market definition is retained because of
its ease of application, then it is clear that thrifts should be included in that
product market when judging the effect of a bank merger on competition.2 67
260. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 11.
261. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 12.
262. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 12 & n.27. The 20% weight was chosen based on
the tax incentives for thrifts to retain a high percentage of real estate mortgage loans, the costs
associated with increased commercial lending, and the statutory limitation of commercial lending to
ten percent of thrift assets. Id.
263. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 12.
264. DOJ Comerica Letter, supra note 227, at 15.
265. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
266. In United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1292 (W.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd,
817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987), the district court held that the relevant line of commerce was the cluster
of products and services provided by commercial banks, rejecting the Justice Department's identifi-
cation of three separate product markets of transaction accounts, business transaction accounts, and
small business loans. The district court acknowledged that there may be identifiable submarkets
within the commercial banking market, but that "'submarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a
broader line of commerce that has economic significance.'" Id. at 1291 (quoting United States v.
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)); cf. Irving Bank Corp. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 845 F.2d 1035, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that a proposed
merger would have no adverse effect on competition measured in the cluster product market or
alternatively in a product market including only certain quite specialized banking services).
267. See, eg., Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 204; Dunham, supra note 62, at 51; Friedlander &
Slayton, Determination of the Relevant Product Market in Bank Mergers: A Time for Reassessment?,
36 Bus. LAW. 1537 (1981); May, supra note 186, at 149-50 ("The inclusion of whole categories of
nonbank financial institutions in the commercial banking market appears to offer the best means of
balancing the need to take nonbank competition into account to provide a judicially manageable
method of analyzing bank mergers."). Several district courts have included thrifts in the line of
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The credit offerings of thrifts no longer are limited to home mortgage loans and
now include a limited ability to offer short-term commercial credit, identified in
Philadelphia National Bank as a "critical area" in which most other depository
institutions were at a disadvantage with commercial banks.26 8 Thrift institu-
tions also offer NOW accounts to consumer customers, and many thrifts are
authorized to offer checking accounts to their commercial loan customers. 269
Finally, federally chartered thrift institutions may exercise trust and fiduciary
powers.270 Thus, the "cluster of products and services" identified by the
Supreme Court in 1963 as the product market in a commercial bank merger is
provided by thrifts as well as by commercial banks.27 1
It is important to recall, however, that thrift institutions in the aggregate
have not yet exercised their commercial lending powers to a significant ex-
tent.272 Thus, it may be argued that the OCC and FDIC approaches-including
one hundred percent of thrift deposits in the product market--overstate the
competitive effect of thrifts, whose enhanced lending powers are subject to spe-
cific asset percentage limitations and which have not yet exercised those lending
powers even to the extent of the statutory limits. 273 The FRB seems to have
implicitly recognized this possible distortion by including only fifty percent of
thrift deposits in the product market. 274 Until thrifts are significant participants
in the commercial lending area, the weighted deposit approach seems to be an
acceptable way of dealing with the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in
Connecticut National Bank.275
The enhancement of thrift powers in the 1980s justifies a reexamination of
the Supreme Court's definition of the product market used to judge the effect of
a proposed bank merger on competition. With the authority to offer those prod-
ucts and services identified with traditional bank functions-such as commercial
loans and transaction accounts-thrift institutions should be regarded, at least
in some respects, functionally equivalent to commercial banks, and considered
when judging the effect of a proposed bank merger on competition. In the light
of the changing regulatory and market structures, the Supreme Court's product
market definition based on the "cluster" of products and services traditionally
commerce. E.g., United States v. Idaho Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D. Idaho 1970); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157, 168 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D.N.J. 1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1180-81 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Provident Nat'l
Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp.
133, 154-57 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
268. See Rosenblum, O'Brien & DiClemente, supra note 186, at 426-27; supra notes 186-89 and
accompanying text.
269. See Whitehead, The Line of Commerce Issue in Commercial Banking: An Overview, ECON.
REv. (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta), April 1982, at 6, 9; supra notes 43 and 54 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 211, at 925 (adding thrifts
to the cluster product market may be overinclusive if thrifts are not competing substantially in vari-
ous products and services).
274. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
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provided by commercial banks is no longer meaningful. 276 Because commercial
banks are no longer the exclusive source of these products and services, and
because bank customers now view many of the traditional commercial banking
products and services as distinct from a cluster of related products, separate
product markets should be identified for each distinct bank product and ser-
vice.2 77 The approach employed by the Justice Department illustrates and real-
istically resolves many of the practical application problems engendered by the
identification of separate product markets. 278 Although there are numerous eco-
nomically distinct bank products and services, only those products with a rela-
tively limited geographic market need be examined closely; in a larger regional
or national geographic market it is not likely a proposed merger will have an
adverse effect on competition. 279 Thrift institutions legally authorized to pro-
vide a product should be included as market participants. Although the level of
thrift participation in a particular product may not yet be significant, the thrift
should be assigned a market share based on its likely response to a significant
nontransitory price increase imposed by commercial banks.280 This approach
properly accounts for the effect on commercial bank competition exerted by
thrifts as potential competitors waiting in the wings.
28 1
Market shares in distinct product markets are best calculated based on evi-
dence of the dollar volume of product each participant currently provides or is
likely to provide in the event of supracompetitive price increases. 2 82 In many
instances, absent evidence provided by the merging parties, this data is not read-
ily available. 283 An alternative and approximate market share measure may be
calculated using deposit shares. 284 In the case of products provided to business
customers, the deposit shares should be weighted by a factor that accounts for
the statutory and practical limitations on the level of business products that may
be provided by thrift institutions. 285 Deposit share data also requires correction
because it precludes direct consideration of competition provided by nonde-
pository institutions. 286 This competition may be indirectly accounted for by
employing higher HHI threshold levels in judging the anticompetitive effects of
bank mergers than for other mergers. 28
7
Although the separate product market approach suggested in this section
would result in a more meaningful measure of concentration than the cluster
approach now applied by the federal bank regulatory agencies, the cluster ap-
proach has many practical advantages. It is easy to administer, the necessary
276. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 227-64 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 254 and 261-62 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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market data is readily available, and the merging entities may easily predict the
outcome of the antitrust analysis. It is clear, however, that if the cluster ap-
proach to product market definition is retained, thrift institutions legally author-
ized to provide each of the products and services previously identified
exclusively with commercial banks should be included in the product market. 288
Including one hundred percent of thrift deposits in the commercial banking
product market, however, is problematical and may overstate the competitive
effect of thrifts when they are not taking advantage of their commercial lending
powers to a significant extent.289 Irrespective of the method of analysis adopted,
the enhancement of thrift powers in the early 1980s giving thrifts the functions
of commercial bankg compels the conclusion that thrift institutions are competi-
tors of commercial banks and should be considered in any analysis of commer-
cial bank competition.
D. Bank Holding Company Market Expansion by Acquisition of a Healthy
Thrift Institution
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB or the Board) has proposed an amend-
ment to its regulations implementing the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
that would allow a bank holding company to expand its market by acquiring a
healthy thrift institution as a nonbanking subsidiary. 290 The FRB stated that
the proposed regulatory revision is prompted in part by "recent changes in the
law substantially broadening the powers of thrift institutions. '291 This section
examines the evolution of the FRB's position on the acquisition of healthy thrift
institutions. It analyzes whether the FRB proposal is justified by the expansion
of thrift powers and whether the proposed regulatory revision exceeds the FRB's
statutory authority. It concludes, as a matter of policy, that the affiliation of a
bank holding company and a healthy thrift institution should be allowed.
1. The Bank Holding Company Act
A bank holding company is a company that controls one or more banks. 292
It is regulated by the FRB pursuant to the BHCA293 and the FRB regulations
implementing the BHCA (known collectively as Regulation Y). 2 9 4 One purpose
of the BHCA is to ensure the separation of the banking business from more
288. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
290. 52 Fed. Reg. 36,041, 36,043 (1987) (proposal to amend 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)).
291. Id.
292. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A bank holding company may be a "corporation, partner-
ship, business trust, association, or similar organization." Id. § 1841(b).
293. Id. §§ 1841-1850.
294. 12 C.F.R. § 225.1-.43 (1988). The law of the state of the holding company's incorporation
must also be considered. Most states provide for the incorporation of a bank holding company and
may have a state bank holding company act setting forth further regulation of the company. See 2
M. MALLOY, supra note 5, § 8.4. For instance, a handful of states prohibit a bank holding company
from owning more than one bank. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1512 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
392 (1988).
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general commercial enterprise. 295 Accordingly, under the BHCA a bank hold-
ing company may own bank subsidiaries2 96 and only those nonbanking subsidi-
aries whose activities are "so closely related to banking... as to be a proper
incident thereto. ' 297 As previously discussed, the Douglas amendment to the
BHCA restricts location of the bank holding company's bank subsidiaries. 298
The locations of a bank holding company's nonbanking subsidiaries, however,
are not restricted. 299
Prior to 1982 the BHCA defined a bank to be an institution that both "(1)
accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans. ' '3° ° Since federally
chartered thrift institutions and most state-chartered thrift institutions were not
authorized to provide either demand deposits or commercial loans, a bank hold-
ing company could not acquire a thrift institution pursuant to its authority to
acquire an additional bank.3 01 In 1982 when Congress granted federally
chartered thrift institutions the ability to make commercial loans in amounts not
exceeding ten percent of an institution's assets and to offer demand deposits to
commercial loan customers, it also amended the BHCA definition of "bank"
specifically to exclude any FSLIC-insured or federally chartered thrift institu-
tion.30 2 Congress redefined "bank" for purposes of the BHCA in 1987 to pre-
clude bank holding companies from avoiding the Douglas Amendment by
establishing limited purpose institutions, but it preserved this specific exclusion
of thrift institutions.30 3
295. P. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 4.01 (1988); see S. REP. No.
1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2482
(bank holding companies should confine their activities to the management and control of banks).
296. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(2) (1982). If the bank subsidiary is located within the same state as the
bank holding company's other bank subsidiaries, the acquisition is subject to the antitrust considera-
tions discussed in Part II.B, and if the acquired bank subsidiary is to be merged into an existing bank
subsidiary, the acquisition is also subject to the branching restrictions discussed in Part II.A.
297. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (acquisition of interest in nonbanking organizations)
(amended 1987). The BHCA provides as a general proposition that "no bank holding company shall
... acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any company which is not
a bank." Id. § 1843(a)(1). There are numerous exceptions to this rule. See id. § 1843(a)(2), (c) &
(d).
298. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
299. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (applies only to acquisition of an additional bank).
300. Id. § 1841(c) (1976) (amended 1982 & 1987).
301. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
302. Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 333, 96 Stat. 1469, 1504
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)) (The definition of bank excludes "an institution the accounts of
which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or an institution
chartered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.").
It is possible that thrifts were explicitly excluded from the BHCA definition of "bank" because
Congress foresaw that some thrift institutions might become engaged in the business of making
commercial loans, and some might not. Absent the thrift exclusion, not only would one have diffi-
culty determining whether a thrift was engaged in the commercial loan business, but some thrifts
would be considered banks subject to BHCA regulation, resulting in additional complications.
303. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a)(1), 101 Stat.
552 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c) (West Supp. 1988)). The 1987 amendment was designed to
close the so-called "nonbank bank" loophole, in which a bank holding company attempted to escape
BHCA regulation (especially limitations on the activities of its nonbanking subsidiaries and the geo-
graphic limitation in the Douglas Amendment on the locations of the bank subsidiaries) by eliminat-
ing its bank subsidiaries' demand deposits or commercial loans so that the bank subsidiaries would
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2. Bank Holding Company Acquisition of a Thrift Institution Prior to the
Enhancement of Thrift Powers
Arguably, the exclusion of thrifts from the BHCA definition of "bank" does
not affect the separate issue of whether a bank holding company may acquire a
thrift as a nonbanking subsidiary. The BHCA states that the FRB may approve
the acquisition of a nonbanking subsidiary if the activities of the subsidiary are
"so closely related to banking.., as to be a proper incident thereto." 3° 4 In 1977
the FRB concluded as a general matter in its D.H. Baldwin Co. ruling that the
activities of a savings and loan association were closely related to banking, but
that the operation of a savings and loan was not a proper incident to banking.30 5
Pursuant to section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, a particular activity is a proper inci-
dent to banking if performance of the activity by a bank holding company sub-
sidiary "can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh
possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or
not satisfy the BHCA's two-pronged definition of "bank." See S. REP. No. 19, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 489, 495-97.
304. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8) (West Supp. 1988).
305. 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280, 281-82, 284, 287 (1977). The FRB denied the application of a bank
holding company to retain the stock of a savings and loan association and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary. Id. at 280. The D.H. Baldwin Company had become a bank holding company as a result of the
1970 amendments to the BHCA subjecting one-bank holding companies to the BHCA. Id. at 281.
The 1970 amendments gave to these holding companies ten-year grandfather rights for the retention
of nonbanking subsidiaries that they acquired between June 30, 1968, and December 31, 1970. D.H.
Baldwin Company acquired the savings and loan association in 1969 and filed this application with
the Board to retain its savings and loan subsidiary beyond the expiration of the grandfather date.
Id.; see also 58 Fed. Res. Bull.717 (1972) (The FRB elected not to include the operation of a savings
and loan association in its list of activities in which bank holding companies may engage through
their nonbanking subsidiaries because the separate regulatory structure of thrifts and banks "sug-
gests past intent on the part of Congress to maintain savings and loan associations as specialized
lenders to finance housing, with specialized rules appropriate to that role."). The FRB also denied
several applications filed by bank holding companies to acquire thrift insititutions as nonbanking
subsidiaries. E.g., Memphis Trust Co., 61 Fed. Res, Bull. 327, 329 (1975) (public benefits to be
achieved by the acquisition were outweighed by the possible diversion of holding company funds
from the needs of the bank subsidiary to the savings and loan subsidiary); American Fletcher Corp.,
60 Fed. Res. Bull. 868, 872 (1974) (public benefits to be achieved by the acquisition did not outweigh
the "significant adverse effects" on the bank holding company because of the diversion of holding
company funds from the needs of the bank subsidiary and the increase of debt necessary to consum-
mate the transaction).
The Board, however, approved several applications from bank holding companies in Rhode
Island to affiliate with Rhode Island mutual building and loan associations, based upon the history of
close affiliation between commercial banks and thrift institutions in that state. Indeed, every thrift of
any size owned a commercial bank and operated its thrift and bank offices in tandem. E.g., Newport
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 562 (1983); Old Colony Co-Operative Bank, 69 Fed.
Res. Bull. 377 (1983); Old Colony Co-Operative Bank, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 665 (1980); Old Colony
Co-Operative Bank, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 417 (1972); Newport Savings and Loan Ass'n, 58 Fed. Res.
Bull. 313 (1972).
The Board also approved affiliations between New Hampshire bank holding companies and
New Hampshire guaranty savings banks, stock savings banks unique to that state. The unique struc-
tural and competitive circumstances in New Hampshire influenced the Board to approve these appli-
cations. E.g., BankEast Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 379 (1982); BankEast Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull.
116 (1982); First Fin. Group of New Hampshire, Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 594 (1980); Heritage
Banks, Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 917 (1980); Heritage Banks, Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 590 (1980);
Profile Bankshares, Inc., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 901 (1975).
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unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices. '30 6 The
Board stated that the potential adverse effects of the affiliation of a bank holding
company and a thrift were "sufficiently strong to outweigh such benefits as
might result in individual cases" 30 7 and left for Congress to decide whether such
affiliations should be permitted on a broad scale. 30 8 The Board's finding that the
activities of a savings and loan association were not a proper incident to banking
was expressly limited, however, to the "present regulatory framework and the
characteristics of banks and S & Ls as they presently operate within that
framework. '30 9
In reaching its decision in D.H. Baldwin, the Board pointed to three areas
of concern. First, the Board noted the regulatory conflict that would result from
the affiliation of a bank holding company and a thrift institution. 310 Savings and
loan associations were statutorily authorized to engage, either directly or
through a service corporation, in some activities that were prohibited for banks
and for the nonbanking subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 3t 1 Moreover, a
bank holding company owning a savings and loan would also be a savings and
loan holding company and subject to conflicting regulation under both the
BHCA and the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act (SLHCA).3 12 As a
savings and loan holding company, the holding company would be authorized to
own a bank subsidiary only if it owned no more than one savings and loan sub-
sidiary.313 The Board thought that it could not responsibly attempt to reconcile
unilaterally the regulatory conflicts brought about by the overlap of the BHCA
and the SLHCA, but rather should wait for congressional guidance. 314
306. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (amended 1987).
307. D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. at 284.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 287. The Board also stated that it did "not intend to suggest that affiliations between
banks and thrift institutions should not be permitted under any circumstances." Id.
310. Id. at 284. In discussing this concern, the Board acknowledged its statement in its earlier
American Fletcher decision that the existence of a separate regulatory structure is not sufficient to
indicate that Congress intended to prohibit common ownership of thrift institutions and banks, but
noted that the Board denied the American Fletcher application on other grounds without having to
examine this broader issue in detail. Id. at 285 (discussing American Fletcher Corp., 60 Fed. Res.
Bull. 868 (1974)).
311. For instance, savings and loans or their subsidiaries could engage in real estate develop-
ment, property management, and operation of insurance agencies. D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 284. If the Board permitted a bank holding company to engage in these activities through a
savings and loan subsidiary, the holding company would have a competitive advantage over bank
holding companies that did not have thrift subsidiaries. Conversely, the Board argued, if the savings
and loan subsidiary were only permitted to engage in those activities previously approved for a bank
holding company's nonbanking subsidiaries, the savings and loan subsidiary would be at a competi-
tive disadvantage with other savings and loans not affiliated with a bank holding company and "the
Board would be 'in effect redefining the role of the savings and loan.'" Id. at 285 (quoting the
FHLBB, which opposed bank holding company acquisitions of savings and loans).
312. Id.
313. Id.; see 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(c)(3), (o) (West Supp. 1988). Thus, if the bank holding com-
pany owned only one savings and loan it would be exempt from the SLHCA's nonsavings and loan
activity restrictions, and the savings and loan subsidiary could be operated consistently with both the
SLHCA and the BHCA if conditions were imposed on the operation of a savings and loan associa-
tion to make its operations fit within the proscriptions of the BHCA. Such conditions, however,
"could prevent full realization of the public benefits that might be expected from the operation of a
savings and loan association." D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. at 285.
314. D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. at 285.
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The Board also set forth in its D.H. Baldwin Co. decision its worry that
ownership of a savings and loan association by a bank holding company would
lead to the erosion of what it perceived as the beneficial institutional rivalry
between banks and thrifts.3 15 Finally, the Board was concerned that approval of
a savings and loan acquisition by a bank holding company subject to no statu-
tory location limitations might serve to undermine the interstate banking restric-
tions of the Douglas Amendment, especially as thrifts exercised more bank-like
powers.3 16
In 1982, however, the Board approved two applications by bank holding
companies to acquire failing savings and loan associations as subsidiaries. 3 17 In
both cases the Board concluded that "the substantial benefits to the public asso-
ciated with preserving [the savings and loan] as a thrift competitor are sufficient
to outweigh the generalized adverse effects found by the Board in the D.H. Bald-
win case."'3 18 The bank holding companies could provide new capital to the
savings and loan associations, enabling them to continue their operations and
remain viable competitors. 319
To reduce the regulatory conflict that would result from the affiliation of a
bank holding company and a savings and loan association, the Board condi-
tioned its approval of one of the acquisitions on the holding company's compli-
ance with both the BHCA and the SLHCA.320 Although the savings and loan
315. Id. at 286. That rivalry had induced thrift institutions to develop NOW accounts in order
to compete with commercial bank checking accounts. Id. Presumably, a thrift institution affiliated
with a bank holding company might not have the same incentive as a nonaffiliated thrift to develop
products to compete with commercial banks.
316. Id. at 286-87. The Board argued that if it approved an application allowing a bank holding
company to acquire a thrift institution in a state in which the Douglas Amendment prohibited the
holding company from acquiring a bank, and "if savings and loan association powers expanded [so]
that savings and loan associations would satisfy the definition of 'bank'... [,J the interstate banking
prohibitions of the Act [would be] substantially undermined." Id. at 286.
317. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 656 (1982); Interstate Financial Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 316
(1982). The first application was submitted by Interstate Financial Corporation, an Ohio bank hold-
ing company, to acquire an Ohio savings and loan association whose deposits were insured by the
Ohio Deposit Guaranty Fund. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 316. The savings and loan was in danger of
failing, and the only organization other than the Interstate Financial Corporation that expressed
interest in acquiring the savings and loan did not have sufficient financial resources to support the
savings and loan. Id. at 317 n.8.
The second application was submitted by Citicorp, a bank holding company, to acquire Fidelity
Federal Savings and Loan Association of San Francisco. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 656. Fidelity was the
successor by supervisory conversion of a state savings and loan association that was closed by the
State of California and placed under FSLIC receivership. Id.
318. Interstate Financial Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 317; accord Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at
663 app. (The adverse factors of bank and thrift affiliation noted in D.H. Baldwin, were "substan-
tially mitigated by the fact that [the savings and loan] is a failing institution that has lost its competi-
tive vigor and is able to continue operations only through substantial federal financial assistance.").
319. Interstate Financial Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 317; accord Citicorp 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at
666 app. In Citicorp the Board concluded that based on its D.H. Baldwin decision it could only
approve an application by a bank holding company to acquire a thrift institution "where public
benefits based on the facts in a particular case outweigh adverse effects. Such compelling public
benefits have only been found where the thrift institution is failing." Id.
320. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 663 app. The Board noted that the acquisition would make
Citicorp a savings and loan holding company, but that because it would be a savings and loan hold-
ing company owning only one savings and loan association, it would be able to continue its bank
holding company and banking activities without violating the SLHCA. Id. In a later acquisition of
an additional failing savings and loan subsidiary by Citicorp, the FHLBB used its authority under
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subsidiary of a bank holding company would not be able to participate in some
activities authorized for federal savings and loan associations because such activ-
ities were not also authorized for the nonbanking subsidiaries of a bank holding
company, the Board noted that bank 'holding company affiliation did not limit
the savings and loan's deposit-taking and lending activities.32 1
In the 1982 legislation expanding the powers of federally chartered thrifts
and excluding thrifts from the BHCA definition of a bank, Congress enacted
specific statutory provisions authorizing bank holding company acquisitions of
failing thrift institutions on an interstate basis 322 in order to provide the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) with additional flexibility in
dealing with financially distressed depository institutions. 32 3 The Act estab-
lished a priority system to aid FSLIC in selecting among competing bids for
failing thrifts. Two guiding principles behind the priority system were "to mini-
mize the cost of financial assistance and to [maintain] ... specialized depository
institutions. '324 Accordingly, priority was given to a bid for a failing thrift from
another thrift institution.32 5 If no other thrift institution submitted an accepta-
ble bid, however, FSLIC could accept a bid from a bank holding company. 326
Pursuant to this authority, FSLIC began selecting bank holding companies as
the successful bidders, and the Board approved several acquisitions of failing
the emergency acquisition procedures to provide that the restrictions limiting the activities of a
savings and loan holding company that owned more than one savings and loan shall not apply to
Citicorp. Citicorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 149, 153 n.11 (1984).
In 1987 the Board granted Citicorp's request for relief from some of these conditions. FRB
Letter, [Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) q 87,070 (1987) (eliminating tandem opera-
tion restrictions between bank holding company and thrift subsidiary located in state in which the
bank holding company could own a bank subsidiary consistent with the Bank Holding Company
Act).
321. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 663 app. & n.20. A further condition of the Board's approval of the
acquisition was that the savings and loan association maintain as its principal business the provision
of residential housing credit. Id. at 659, 644 app.
322. The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 123(a), 96 Stat. 1469, 1483 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(m) (West Supp. 1988)). This authority was effective Octo-
ber 15, 1982. Id. § 807(a), 96 Stat. at 1548; see 12 U.S.C. § 3801 note (1982).
323. SEN. REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3054, 3055.
324. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(3)(B) (1982).
325. If the offer presenting the lowest expense to FSLIC is from a thrift institution or a savings
and loan holding company located in the same state as the failing thrift, FSLIC must accept the
offer. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(3)(A) (1982); see also SEN. REP. No. 536, supra note 38, at 7, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3054, 3061.
326. If the lowest acceptable bid is not submitted by an in-state thrift, FSLIC may ask for a
second round of bids from all offerors who submitted bids close in amount to the lowest acceptable
offer. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(m)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1988) (only those offerors submitting bids within
15% or $15,000,000, whichever is less, of the lowest acceptable offer may submit additional bids).
The statutory scheme gives first priority to a proposed acquisition between depository institutions of
the same type within the same state. Id. § 1730a(m)(3)(B)(i). Should a bank holding company's bid
for a failing thrift institution be accepted, the thrift may retain its existing branches and facilities but
otherwise may only establish new branches subject to the same branching conditions as would be
applicable to a national bank located in the same state as the thrift. Id. § 1730a(m)(5)(A).
A similar structure was set forth in § 116 of the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, adding 12
U.S.C. § 1823(f) (amended 1983 & 1987) for emergency interstate, interindustry acquisitions of
failed or failing FDIC-insured banks. In the case of a bank acquisition approved pursuant to this
authority, the Douglas Amendment does not apply. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1982) (amended 1983 &
1987); id. § 1842(d) (amended 1987).
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savings and loan associations by bank holding companies.3 2 7 In 1985 the legisla-
tive authorization of these acquisitions expired.3 28 After temporary extension,
32 9
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 reinstituted on a permanent basis
the authority of FSLIC to arrange an emergency acquisition of an insured thrift
institution by a bank holding company.330
Bank holding companies desiring to affiliate with healthy thrift institutions,
however, sought to avoid the Board's D.H. Baldwin ruling that operation of a
healthy thrift institution is not a proper incident to banking. Some arranged to
acquire a thrift institution that, just prior to the proposed acquisition, converted
its charter from that of a thrift to that of a bank.331 The acquisition of the result-
ing commercial bank was then subject to approval by the Board as an acquisi-
tion by a bank holding company of an additional bank subsidiary. 332 The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, however, asserted that it had to approve a
thrift institution's exit from the FSLIC insurance fund to the FDIC insurance
327. E.g., Hibernia Bancshares Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 342 (1986) (acquisition by a California
bank holding company of a California federal savings bank); Citicorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 157 (1984)
(acquisition of New Biscayne Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, Miami, Florida); Citicorp, 70 Fed.
Res. Bull. 149 (acquisition of First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Chicago, Illinois).
Between the expiration of the failing thrift acquisition legislation in 1986 and its reinstatement
in 1987, the FRB approved a bank holding company's application to acquire a failing thrift institu-
tion under its general authority to authorize acquisitions of nonbanking subsidiaries. Ranier Bancor-
poration, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 666, 667 (1986).
328. The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320 § 141(a)(7), 96 Stat. at 1489 (ex-
pired Oct. 15, 1985).
329. E.g., Act of Aug. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-400, § l(a), 100 Stat. 902, 902 (extended emer-
gency acquisition provision to September 15, 1986); Act of Oct. 8, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-452, § 1(c),
100 Stat. 1140 (1986) (extended emergency acquisition provisions to October 15, 1986).
330. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 509(a), 101 Stat. 552,
635 (permanently extended emergency interstate, interindustry acquisition authority by deleting the
sunset provision of the 1982 act and subsequent amendments to that sunset provision); see, e.g., 52
Banking Rep. (BNA) 10 (1989) (FRB approval of Southeast Banking Corporation's application to
acquire two failing savings and loan associations).
331. E.g., Hartford Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 752 (1987) (approval of application by bank
holding company to acquire a state-chartered savings bank to be insured by the FDIC that would be
the successor by merger of a state-chartered savings and loan association insured by the FDIC);
Bank of New England, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1986) (approving acquisition of FSLIC insured sav-
ings bank where such institution would convert to a national bank upon acquisition).
The purchase of only a portion of the assets of a thrift institution may be an additional way to
avoid the D.H. Baldwin ruling. In 1987 Citicorp's federal savings and loan association subsidiary in
California received the Board's permission to purchase less than one-third of the assets and liabilities
of a California-chartered savings and loan association. Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 669 (1987). The
Board viewed this transaction "as the permissible acquisition of certain assets and liabilities of S&L
branches rather than the acquisition of an S&L" that would have required the Board "to reconsider
its D.H. Baldwin decision that the acquisition of a healthy thrift is not generally a proper incident to
banking." Id. at 669. The Board distinguished this order from its ruling in Old Stone Corp., 70 Fed.
Res. Bull. 593 (1984), in which it denied a bank holding company's proposal to acquire through an
existing savings and loan subsidiary all of the assets and liabilities of a healthy savings and loan
subsidiary. Citicorp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 669 n.5.
332. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). The Board indicated that these acquisitions did not fall within
the D.H. Baldwin ruling because the acquired subsidiary was subject to regulation as a bank under
the BHCA. Hartford Nat' Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 753. Similarily, state -chartered savings
banks that were not exempted by the Garn-St Germain Act from the BHCA definition of "banks,"
which accept demand deposits and make commercial loans, are treated as "banks" for purposes of
the BHCA analysis. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bancorporation, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 487 (1986) (approv-
ing acquisition of state-chartered stock savings bank insured by FDIC); Hartford Nat'l Corp., 72
Fed. Res. Bull. 274 (1986) (same).
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fund covering the deposits of commercial banks333 and that any exiting institu-
tions must pay FSLIC an exit fee.334 The Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987 placed a moratorium on the exit of thrift institutions from FSLIC for the
purpose of converting to bank charters and FDIC insurance. 335 The morato-
rium, originally set to expire in August 1988,336 has been extended for an addi-
tional year.337
3. Proposed Regulatory Revision Allowing Bank Holding Company
Acquisition of a Healthy Thrift Institution
Barely a month after Congress imposed the moratorium on thrift exits from
FSLIC, the FRB asked for comments on the proposed rule amending Regula-
tion Y to add "[a]cquiring and operating thrift institutions" to the list of activi-
ties considered so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto.338
The Board pointed to the 1980 and 1982 legislation granting thrifts the ability to
make commercial loans, accept NOW accounts, and accept demand deposits
from commercial loan customers as supporting the proposal.339 These eco-
nomic and regulatory changes reduced the Board's concerns, as expressed in
D.H. Baldwin, about regulatory conflict and diminished institutional rivalry. 34°
Furthermore, recently passed state laws that significantly increased interstate
banking opportunities in many states lessened the Board's additional concern
that the Douglas Amendment's general prohibition against interstate banking
would be undermined if a bank holding company could purchase a thrift
333. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a) (1982) provides that an institution may leave FSLIC upon notice. Nev-
ertheless, the FHLBB issued a "clarification" of its policy statement relating to this provision, pro-
viding that a FSLIC exit had to be approved by the FHLBB. The FHLBB was enjoined from
enforcing this rule because it was not promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. The rule was repromulgated in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,937 (1987).
334. 52 Fed. Reg. 17,408 (1987) (the FHLBB issued a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding
exit fees).
335. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 306(h), 101 Stat. 552
(current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730 note (West Supp. 1988)) (the prohibition on exit from FSLIC
does not apply in the case of an emergency acquisition arranged by FSLIC).
336. Id. § 306(h)(1) (the moratorium applies "during the 1-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act").
337. H.R. 3251, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988). "The FHLBB requested the extension out of
concern that healthy, FSLIC-insured thrifts would gain FDIC insurance coverage and cease paying
the weakened FSLIC much-needed premiums and special assessments." 50 Banking Rep. (BNA)
947 (1988); accord 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 80 (1988) (The Senate decided to extend the moratorium
on thrift exits citing concern over the health of FSLIC.).
Upon expiration of the moratorium, thrift institutions leaving FSLIC for the FDIC pursuant to
a thrift-to-bank charter conversion will be required to pay an exit fee to FSLIC equal to twice the
annual FSLIC insurance premium and special assessment. Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, § 302(f)(4) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441(f)(4) (West Supp. 1988)) (the exit fee may
be reduced in the case of a weakened institution).
338. 52 Fed. Reg. 36,041, 36,045 (Sept. 25, 1987) (proposal to amend 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b) by
adding the quoted material), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,084.
339. Id. The Board pointed to the elimination of the interest rate ceilings applicable to interest-
bearing deposit accounts and the removal of the interest rate differential which previously allowed
thrifts to pay a slightly higher interest rate on deposit accounts than commercial banks.
340. Id.
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institution. 34 1
As a final matter, the Board noted that the D.H. Baldwin ruling "serves as
an incentive for healthy thrifts to seek to leave the FSLIC fund" go that, after
conversion to a bank charter, acquisition by a bank holding company would be
possible. 342 The exit of healthy thrift institutions from FSLIC could affect
FSLIC's recapitalization plans, the Board noted, by reducing the number of
healthy institutions continuing to pay premiums to support the FSLIC insurance
fund. 34 3
The Board received numerous comments on its proposal to amend Regula-
tion Y but has not yet issued a final rule.344 The Board may be waiting for
Congress to enact banking reform legislation before considering this matter fur-
ther,345 or it is possible the Board has decided to table any further action on the
proposal because of the many adverse comments it received. 346 Nevertheless, by
its proposal the Board has indicated that it believes legislation enhancing the
powers of thrift institutions may warrant a significant change in Board policy
and justify the affiliation of bank holding companies and healthy thrift
institutions.
341. Id. At the time of the D.H. Baldwin decision, no state had a statute complying with the
Douglas Amendment and allowing interstate banking. The Board noted in its request for comments
on the proposed rulemaking, however, that "interstate banking has become widespread." Id. Al.
most half of the states now or will soon have statutes authorizing nationwide interstate banking and
all the remaining states, except for a handful, authorize interstate banking on a regional basis, Thus,
the Board concluded that these developments "undermine one of the basic reasons for the D.H.
Baldwin decision--concern about impairing the Congressional policy embodied in the Douglas
Amendment." Hawke, It's Time for a Policy Change to Let Banks and S & Ls Affiliate, Amer.
Banker, p. 6, col. 3 (Jan. 16, 1987) ("It was Congress itself.., that expanded the powers of thrifts
and excluded FSLIC-insured thrifts from the reach of the Douglas Amendment. Why, then, should
the Fed be more concerned than Congress about the interstate banking implications of savings and
loan acquisitions?").
342. 52 Fed. Reg. at 36,043.
343. Id.
344. The Association of Bank Holding Companies was quick to announce its approval of tile
Board's proposal, stating that the acquisition of healthy thrifts would provide bank holding compa-
nies "'geographic ... and product options that they don't currently have.'" Banking Week, Sept.
21, 1987, at I (quoting Richard M. Whiting, general counsel of the Association of Bank Holding
Companies). The thrift industry, however, is divided over the Board's proposal. The National
Council of Savings Institutions and the Association of Thrift Holding Companies favor the change in
acquisition policy, arguing that it would attract much needed capital into the troubled savings and
loan industry. 49 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1022-23 (1987). In contrast, the U.S. League of Savings
Institutions strongly opposes the Board's proposal, maintaining that bank holding company acquisi-
tion of healthy thrifts would have a detrimental effect on the FSLIC. 49 Banking Rep. (BNA) 872-
73 (1987); see Banking Week, Jan. 25, 1988, at 5.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board announced on Oct. 10, 1988, that a bank holding com-
pany that agrees to acquire a failing thrift may also acquire a healthy thrift. 51 Banking Rep. (BNA)
654 (1988) (FRB approval of the thrift acquisitions would still be required, however).
345. See infra note 384.
346. See supra note 344. Other comments opposing the proposal were filed by Senator Proxmire
(chair of the Senate Banking Committee), Representative St Germain (chair of the House Banking
Committee), Representative Wylie (member of the House Banking Committee), and the FHLBB
(opposing the proposal unless it is linked with a requirement that the acquiring bank holding com-
pany purchase several failing thrifts in addition to the healthy thrifts purchased); see also Banking
Week, Jan. 4, 1988, at I (Board may modify or withdraw proposal in face of congressional opposi-
tion). But see Banking Week, Nov. 30, 1987 (letters of support for Board's proposal outnumber
letters of opposition).
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4. Evaluation of Proposed Regulatory Revision
A strong argument may be made that the FRB's proposed regulatory revi-
sion exceeds its current statutory authority and that congressional action is re-
quired to authorize bank holding company acquisitions of healthy thrifts. It was
the FRB's own view in its 1977 D.H. Baldwin ruling that Congress, rather than
the FRB, should decide whether broad-scale affiliations of bank holding compa-
nies and thrifts should be permitted.347 Since that time the need for Congres-
sional authorization has become even clearer. In the Garn-St Germain Act of
1982 Congress made two significant statutory changes. First, Congress
amended the BHCA definition of "bank" specifically to exclude thrift institu-
tions.348 Thus, Congress foreclosed the argument that a bank holding company
could purchase a thrift under its authority to acquire an additional bank subsidi-
ary, although the Garn-St Germain Act also authorized federally chartered
thrifts to exercise powers previously reserved exclusively to banks. The second
significant change was the inclusion of statutory provisions setting forth the cir-
cumstances and conditions under which a bank holding company could
purchase a failing thrift institution. 349 This action suggests that if special statu-
tory provisions exist to authorize the acquisition of a failing thrift, the FRB may
not by regulation authorize a bank holding company to acquire a healthy thrift
institution as a nonbanking subsidiary.
The effect of bank holding company acquisitions of thrift institutions on the
Douglas Amendment restrictions relating to interstate bank acquisitions also de-
serves congressional attention. Congress specifically exempted the acquisition of
failing thrift institutions from the scope of the Douglas Amendment by defining
"bank" acquisitions subject to the Douglas Amendment to exclude thrift institu-
tions.350 Moreover, the statutory provisions allowing a bank holding company
to acquire a failing thrift specifically provide that branches established by a thrift
acquired by a bank holding company may be located only where a national bank
may establish and operate a branch in the state.351 This restriction suggests that
banks and thrifts are so similar that they should be subject to the same geo-
graphic expansion restrictions. 352 Thus, it seems likely that because the stated
reason for allowing healthy thrift acquisitions is the increased statutory similar-
ity of thrifts and banks, Congress would also wish to subject healthy thrift acqui-
347. See S. 413, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989) (proposing an amendment to the Bank Hold-
ing Company act that would allow a bank holding company to acquire any thrift institution effective
two years after the date of enactment).
348. See supra note 302.
349. See supra notes 322-30 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
351. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(m)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
352. The branching restrictions (1) minimize the impact of bank holding company thrift acquisi-
tions on the authority of a state to limit the expansion of financial institutions within its borders, (2)
prevent thrifts owned by bank holding companies from branching more freely than local commercial
banks, thus avoiding an unfair competitive impact especially in a federally assisted acquisition, and
(3) implement the Congressional intent expressed in the legislative history of the Garn-St Germain
Act to promote competitive equality between thrifts and commercial bank branches. 52 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 9 (1989).
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sitions to the Douglas Amendment locational limitations. 353
Nevertheless, a reexamination of the continuing validity of the D.H. Bald-
win ruling is appropriate. As thrifts have come to resemble banks more closely,
operation of a thrift institution by a bank holding company becomes even more
closely related to banking than before. Since fewer ill effects would therefore
arise from bank holding company and thrift affiliation, it is a proper inference
that, as a policy matter, operation of a thrift institution is a proper incident to
banking.
The reasons underlying the D.H. Baldwin policy that operation of a thrift
institution is not a proper incident to banking are not convincing. 35 4 Regulatory
conflict has little, if anything, to do with the adverse effects of affiliation, such as
undue concentration of resources, enumerated as part of the "proper incident"
test in the BHCA.355 Furthermore, the objection is not convincing on a practi-
cal level because bank holding companies have acquired failing thrifts and oper-
ated them subject to overlapping regulatory structures without adverse
consequences. 356
Institutional rivalry between banks and thrifts has produced little of conse-
quence other than NOW accounts that were first developed by state thrift insti-
tutions attempting to find a legal method to offer a transaction-type account. 357
Indeed, if such institutional rivalry spurs desirable competition between banks
and thrifts, then healthy competition is likely to increase rather than decrease as
a result of the enhancement of thrift powers to make them more like bank pow-
ers. Bank holding company ownership of a thrift by itself cannot be said to
reduce incentives of the thrift subsidiaries or the bank subsidiaries to compete or
innovate.
Finally, whether healthy thrift acquisitions will undermine the intent of the
Douglas Amendment is a legitimate concern that should be addressed by Con-
gress. Increasing similarity between thrifts and banks suggests increasing need
to subject them, when possible, to similar market expansion restrictions. 358
Thus, acquisitions of healthy thrifts should be subject to the Douglas Amend-
ment. This preserves an important inducement to bank holding companies to
acquire failing thrift institutions, because failing thrift acquisitions are not sub-
ject to Douglas Amendment limitations. 359
One of the justifications for the FRB's proposal to amend Regulation Y to
allow acquisitions of healthy thrifts is that charter flips from thrift to bank char-
ters will be eliminated because bank holding companies may acquire thrifts with-
out first converting the thrift to a bank charter. If the FRB's proposal is
353. Moreover, if the thrift to be acquired operates in the same geographic market as an existing
bank subsidiary, the FRB must determine whether the acquisition may tend substantially to lessen
competition as is discussed in Part I.B supra.
354. See supra notes 307-16 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 43.
358. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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adopted, thrift-to-bank charter conversions will not be necessary to consummate
acquisitions, but it still will be possible for a bank holding company to acquire a
thrift institution and after the acquisition effect a conversion to a bank charter,
operating the new bank as a separate bank subsidiary or merging it into an ex-
isting bank subsidiary. The harm from such a conversion is the loss to FSLIC of
the deposit insurance premiums and special assessments paid by a healthy thrift
institution. To help ensure that few institutions leave FSLIC, exit fees could be
charged, as FSLIC has proposed.3 60 Continuing the FSLIC exit moratorium,
however, would seem to be the only way to eliminate entirely FSLIC exits. 36
1
The FRB's proposal to increase the market expansion opportunities avail-
able to bank holding companies by authorizing the acquisition of healthy thrift
institutions as nonbanking subsidiaries arguably exceeds the FRB's statutory au-
thority. Congressional enactment of legislation authorizing the acquisition of
failing thrift institutions by bank holding companies gives rise to the inference
that, absent further statutory amendment, Congress did not contemplate bank
holding company acquisitions of healthy thrift institutions. As a policy matter,
however, the proposal is consistent with the enhancement of thrift powers.
Ownership of a thrift that is authorized to perform nearly all of the functions
traditionally associated with commercial banking appears to be both closely re-
lated and a proper incident to banking.
E. Conclusion
Increased market expansion opportunities for banks and bank holding com-
panies by branching, merger, and the proposed regulation to permit bank hold-
ing companies to acquire healthy thrifts have been triggered by the same event-
the statutory enhancement of thrift institution powers. These changes in thrift
powers, which grant thrifts the ability to make loans other than home mortgage
loans and to offer transaction accounts in addition to savings accounts, justify
reexamination of each of the three methods of bank and bank holding company
market expansion discussed in this Article. At bottom the question is, should
thrifts be treated as functionally equivalent to commercial banks for purposes of
market expansion? The answer must be yes.
First, treating thrifts as the functional equivalents of commercial banks is
required by the McFadden Act, in which Congress has allocated to the states
determinations relating to a state bank's ability to branch, and has specifically
provided that a national bank's ability to branch will be commensurate with
state bank branching privileges. 362 Congress, however, defined "state bank"
broadly to include not only entities chartered as state commercial banks, but
also any institution carrying on the banking business under the authority of state
360. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text. If the FDIC and FSLIC deposit insurance
systems are merged, as the Administration has recently proposed, protection of FSLIC from a loss of
revenue no longer serves as a sufficient reason to prohibit FSLIC exits and thrift-to-bank charter
conversions.
362. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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law. 363 Thus, if a state has authorized its state-chartered thrift institutions to
engage in the functions associated with commercial banking and has granted
them broader branching privileges than state-chartered commercial banks, it is
entirely proper to permit national banks to establish branches in those locations
permitted to state thrifts. 364
Treating thrifts as functional equivalents of commercial banks allows a
more realistic measure of the competitive effect of bank mergers than the "clus-
ter" approach to product market definition.365 More meaningful markets of
particular banking products and services can be identified, and the effect of all
institutions, including thrifts, that provide the product in that market can be
calculated. 36 6
Finally, treating thrifts as functional equivalents of commercial banks has
led the FRB to reexamine its policy regarding bank holding company ownership
of healthy thrifts, and the Board has concluded that ownership of a thrift that is
the functional equivalent of a bank must perforce be closely related and a proper
incident to banking.367 In the light of congressional enactments enabling bank
holding companies to acquire failing thrifts, however, similar congressional ac-
tion is necessary to authorize bank holding company acquisitions of healthy
thrifts. 368
III. IMPACT OF INCREASED BANK AND BANK HOLDING COMPANY
MARKET EXPANSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS SYSTEM
The changes in the market expansion opportunities of banks and bank hold-
ing companies discussed in this Article, as they exist now and as they are likely
to develop in the future, will have significant effects on the structure of the de-
pository institutions system. One effect of these changes may be increasingly to
centralize our decentralized banking system. These changes present possibilities
for expansion into new markets by branching, merger, and by holding company
acquisition of healthy thrift institutions. Ultimately, these changes may lead to
consolidation of financial institutions and more nationwide financial conglomer-
ates. Branching opportunities for both national and state banks have increased
as a result of the Deposit Guaranty ruling. In those states where state-chartered
thrifts are afforded more extensive branching privileges than state-chartered
banks, many national banks have filed with the OCC what are now termed "De-
posit Guaranty applications" to establish branches in locations permitted for
state thrifts but prohibited to state banks.369 Thus far, the OCC has denied only
363. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 227-45 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 338-46 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
369. Banking Week, July 25, 1988, at 5, col. 3 (as of June 30, 1988, 100 Deposit Guaranty-type
branching applications had been filed with the Comptroller); 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 670-71
(1988) (Following the Fifth Circuit's holding in Deposit Guaranty, 78 banks applied to the OCC for
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one such application. 370 It has approved almost sixty others.371 In addition, the
threat of conversion of state banks to national charters has influenced lawmakers
in some states to amend state commercial bank branching statutes to allow state-
chartered banks to branch as broadly as state-chartered thrift institutions and
national banks.372
Redefinition of the product market in the bank merger context to include
additional competitors, such as thrift institutions, will also have a significant
effect on the structure of the depository institutions system.373 Including thrifts
in the product market as providers of the traditional commercial bank cluster of
products and services has reduced the number of proposed mergers found to
increase concentration impermissibly in the market. 374 Even though the FRB
permission to branch more freely.); e.g., Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Appli-
cations of the National Bank of Commerce, Memphis, Tenn. and the First National Bank of Living-
ston, Livingston, Tenn. to Establish Domestic Branch Offices in Counties other than in the County
in which their Principal Offices are Located, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) V 87,212 (Oct. 2, 1987),
affid, Volunteer State Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 684 F. Supp. 964 (M.D. Tenn. 1988);
Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application of the Hibernia National Bank of
New Orleans, La. to Establish Domestic Branch Offices Within One Hundred Miles of Its Principal
Office, in a Parish Other Than the Parish in which Its Principal Office is Located, [Current] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) % 87,322 (Dec. 3, 1987).
370. Letter from Ballard C. Gilmore, Director for Corporate Activity, Bank Organization and
Structure, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Richard R. Cheatham, Kilpatrick & Cody
(Mar. 31, 1987), reprinted in 2 H. PiTr, D. MILES & A. AIN, supra note 22, app. at E-13.1 (denying
the application of a national bank located in Georgia because it failed to demonstrate that Georgia-
chartered thrifts are carrying on the banking business). Georgia has no "wild card" statute affording
to state-chartered thrift institutions those powers that may be approved for their federally chartered
counterparts from time to time.
371. 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 660 (1988) (as of October 8, 1988, 58 Deposit Guaranty-type appli-
cations had been approved by the OCC).
372. 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 865-66 (1988) (Alabama adopted a bill in May 1988 granting state-
chartered banks the same powers and privileges as those held by nationally chartered banks, includ-
ing a national bank's branching privileges); id. at 954 (Mississippi enacted legislation granting Mis-
sissippi state-chartered banks the branching rights afforded to national banks); 51 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 88, 88-89 (1988) (Arkansas legislature passed bill authorizing branching within contiguous
Arkansas counties in five years and statewide branching in 10 years as a result of the Deposit Guar-
anty decision); id. at 51 (Michigan passed bill authorizing statewide branching for state-chartered
commercial banks); id. at 948-49 (Florida legislature empowered State Comptroller to approve
cross-county branching applications filed by state banks to preserve branching parity with national
banks).
373. Eisenbeis, Regulatory Agencies' Approaches to the "Line of Commerce", ECON. REV. (Fed.
Res. Bank of Atlanta), April 1982, at 20, 27 ("broadening of the line of commerce ... has the
potential to precipitate a consolidation of the banking system").
374. Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 204, at 386 ("The broader the [product market] definition,
the more permissive acquisition policy would be, and the likelihood of finding substantially adverse
competitive effects under the antitrust laws would be reduced."); Dunham, supra note 62, at 51 ("If
thrift institutions are ever included in the commercial banking line of commerce, large commercial
banks would immediately find it easier to merge under existing antitrust guidelines .. "); Dunham
& Guerin-Calvert, supra note 62, at 47 ("The result [of including thrifts in the product market]
would be a quantum leap in the number of permissible bank mergers.").
Although some may object that including thrifts in the line of commerce will emasculate
the antitrust laws in this area by so lowering market shares and concentration ratios that
almost any bank merger will be permissible... it seems incongruous to argue that there is
a serious anticompetitive threat posed simply by more realistically recognizing the unparal-
leled level of competition existing in today's depository institutions industry.
Comment, Banking-Mergers-Is Commercial Banking Still A Distinct Line of Commerce?, 57
TUL. L. REV. 958, 992 (1983); see also Alcaly & Nelson, Will Including Thrifts in the Banking
Market Affect Mergers?, 97 BANKING L.J. 346, 348-49 (1980) (demonstrating in the context of hypo-
thetical mergers between the second and third largest banks in various local banking markets in New
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generally considers only fifty percent of thrift deposits in its market concentra-
tion calculation, a study of FRB merger decisions issued between November
1982 and July 1985 indicates that when only commercial banks were considered
in the line of commerce, thirty-one proposed mergers were likely to be chal-
lenged by the Department of Justice according to the standards set forth in the
Department's published merger guidelines.375 When the deposits of thrift insti-
tutions were factored into the line of commerce, however, only nine of the pro-
posed mergers were likely to be challenged.3 76 This increase in the number of
merger approvals is further reason to question the continued validity of the clus-
ter approach to market definition.377 Analysis of competition based on markets
composed of the separate products and services offered by the merging banks
provides a more accurate method of determining which mergers will tend to
lessen competition in a particular product market.3 78
If bank holding companies are allowed to acquire thrift institutions (either
through a statutory change in the BHCA or unchallenged FRB action in finaliz-
ing the proposed regulatory revision), further expansion of bank holding com-
pany financial networks is likely, possibly leading to more nationwide financial
conglomerates.
A second major effect of these changes in bank and bank holding company
market expansion methods is that they will likely lead to a restructuring of the
regulatory systems applicable to banks and thrifts at the state and federal levels.
These separate regulatory systems were developed when banks and thrifts per-
formed clearly separate functions. Today, however, irrational and confusing
regulatory decisions result from the maintenance of separate structures regulat-
ing what are now functionally similar institutions.
This Article has pointed to several areas of regulatory irrationality that re-
sult from this situation. For instance, many states allow state thrifts to branch
to a greater extent than state banks, but have granted to state thrifts bank-like
powers so that they may be said to be carrying on the banking business under
the authority of state laws. 379 The Deposit Guaranty decision has exposed the
irrationality of this system by affording national banks the broader branching
privileges of state thrifts. The probable result of this decision is that many states
York and New Jersey that in only five of the 54 market areas does inclusion of thrifts reduce the
combined market shares of the second and third largest banks to below 10%); cf. Fisehel, Rosenfield
& Stillman, supra note 19, at 333 ("even if economies of scale in banking are significant, we question
whether officially sanctioning interstate banking would have much incremental effect on bank mar-
ket structure").
375. Loeys, supra note 206, at 435.
376. Loeys, supra note 206, at 435. Of the nine cases in the suspect area, three were denied on
competitive grounds and two required divestiture of certain banking operations. All five of these
cases were well beyond the Justice Department approval guidelines. Three of the four remaining
cases were approved based on other mitigating factors. Id.
377. Note, supra note 211, at 924 ("combining thrifts and banks in the cluster approach ...
could produce undesirable increases in the concentration of financial resources").
378. See Bleier & Eisenbeis, supra note 204, at 386 & n.21 (acknowledging that a broad product
market definition will reduce the findings of adverse competitive effects, although a disaggregation of
product lines could result in the application of stricter antitrust standards).
379. See supra Part II.A.
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will rationalize their statutes regulating depository institutions to equalize state
bank and state thrift branching privileges. 380
A second example of irrationality brought about by the maintenance of sep-
arate bank and thrift regulatory structures is the position that a bank holding
company should not be able to acquire a healthy thrift institution because opera-
tion of such an institution is not a proper incident to banking.3 81 One justifica-
tion given for this ruling was the conflict in regulatory structures relating to
bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies. 382 In the case
of acquisitions of failing thrifts this regulatory conflict has been resolved by lim-
iting the activities of the thrift subsidiary to those permissible for holding com-
pany subsidiaries under both the Bank Holding Company Act and the Savings
and Loan Holding Company Act--creating a third, hybrid holding company
regulatory structure.38 3 The Federal Reserve Board has now asserted that con-
flicting regulatory structures should not prevent a holding company affiliation
that otherwise satisfies the statutory prerequisite of being closely related to
banking. 384
The Administration, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation have proposed that the separate regulatory struc-
tures relating to banks and thrifts be dismantled in favor of a unified regulatory
scheme.38 5 Although the changes in bank and bank holding company market
expansion methods discussed in this Article may not be prominently cited as
reasons for this change, they will certainly play an important role in the push for
regulatory reform.
380. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 304-16 and accompanying text. Moreover, if bank holding companies are
allowed to acquire healthy thrift institutions, savings and loan holding companies owning more than
one savings and loan subsidiary should also be allowed to acquire a commercial bank subsidiary.
382. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
385. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, S. 413, S.774
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), recently proposed by the administration, sets forth extensive reforms to
the financial institutions regulatory structure. Pursuant to this bill, FSLIC would be dissolved and
the insurance of thrift deposits would be brought under the control of the FDIC. The FHLBB
would likewise be abolished and the Secretary of the Treasury would oversee the Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System (a renamed and restructured FHLBB), who would regulate feder-
ally chartered thrift institutions. The bill would also allow a bank holding company to acquire
healthy thrifts (effective two years after the enactment) and would prohibit the Federal Reserve
Board from imposing restrictions on tandem operations of thrifts and banks owned by the same bank
holding company. Id.; see also [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,527 (Jan. 4, 1989)
(FDIC proposal to improve federal deposit insurance calling for a comprehensive reform of the thrift
regulatory structure, merging the FSLIC and the FDIC and transferring oversight of federally
chartered thrifts to the OCC and oversight of thrift holding companies to the FRB).
1989]

